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PLACE MATTERS (MOST): AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING IN DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES
Katherine Barnes,* David Sloss** & Stephen Thaman***

This Article investigates prosecutorialdiscretion in death penalty prosecution in
Missouri. Based upon an empirical analysis of all intentional-homicidecasesfrom
1997-2001, this Article concludes that Missouri law gives prosecutors
unconstitutionally broaddiscretion in charging these cases. This Article also finds
that prosecutors exercise this broad discretion differently, leading to geographic
and racial disparities in sentencing, and concludes with proposalsfor statutory
reform.
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the death penalty in America, race matters. Since the
time of David Baldus' landmark study of the Georgia death penalty,' studies have
found that white victims are afforded higher status-with their killers receiving
harsher penalties-and in some cases black defendants are treated more harshly
than white defendants, particularly if their victims are white. 2 Furthermore, death
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Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for International &
Comparative Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. The authors would like to thank
Marc Miller, David Baldus, Catherine Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Christopher Slobogin, Margo
Schlanger, Carol Rose, Jack Chin, Doug Berman, and participants at colloquia at Duke Law
School, the 2006 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and the University of Virginia for
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helpful comments. Katherine Bames would also like to acknowledge the assistance of John
Hobbins at the McGill Law Library, for kindly providing work space and access to
materials while this manuscript was being completed.
1.

DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).

2.

See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the

Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience, 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 499-502 (2002) [hereinafter Nebraska Study]; David C.

Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-FurmanEra: An
Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1658-60 (1998) [hereinafter Philadelphia Study]. Still, this finding does not
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penalty prosecutions in urban and rural areas are different. Unlike race-based
differences, however, geography does not result in differential treatment that
consistently disfavors the same group: depending on the particular region studied,
sometimes defendants in urban communities are treated more harshly,43 while in
other regions, defendants in rural communities are treated more harshly.
The most recent of these studies focused on states such as Nebraska and
Maryland,5 which have executed very few people.6 In contrast, Missouri is one of
the nation's leading death penalty states. Having executed sixty-six prisoners since
the death penalty was reinstated, Missouri ranks fourth in the country in the total
number of executions since 1976, behind Texas, Virginia and Oklahoma, and just
ahead of Florida.7 Missouri ranks fifth per capita, behind Oklahoma, Texas,
Delaware, and Virginia. 8 This Article is the only recent study that provides a
detailed empirical analysis of capital punishment in one of9the "top five" death
penalty states, except for an ABA-sponsored study of Florida.
In focusing on Missouri, this Article finds that Missouri is no exception to
the rule that race matters in the prosecution of murder and use of the death

appear in all states, or all time periods. See Nebraska Study, supra, at 499-502. These
studies measure charging, trial, and sentencing outcomes. Thus, harsher treatment includes a
defendant being charged with a more serious crime (first-degree versus second-degree
murder, for example); facing a death penalty trial (rather than a non-death-penalty firstdegree murder trial); being given a harsher sentence, either in terms of life versus death, or a
longer term of years; or, finally, being executed versus serving time in prison.
3.
See Nebraska Study, supra note 2, at 623-24; Philadelphia Study, supra note
2, at 1658-60.
4.
See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND
LEGAL JURISDICTION 30 (Jan. 7, 2003), available at http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/

pdf/finalrep.pdf [hereinafter Maryland Study].
5.
See Nebraska Study, supra note 2; Maryland Study, supranote 4.
6.
Maryland has executed only five people since 1976. Nebraska has executed
three people. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By
State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-united-states-1608-1976-state
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2009).
7.
Texas is in first place with 413 executions, followed by Virginia with 102
and Oklahoma with 87. Trailing closely behind Missouri are Florida with 65 executions,
North Carolina with 43, and Georgia with 42. See id.
8.
After rounding off the July 2006 populations of the states in millions to one
decimal point, Missouri executed 11.4 per million population since 1976. Oklahoma led
with 23.3 per million, followed by Texas with 16.3, Delaware with 15.5, and Virginia with
12.9. The census data is from U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder,
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
9.
See ABA EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida.html
[hereinafter
Florida
Study]. The ABA has conducted a series of studies of the death penalty in various states,
focusing on process as defined statutorily. See generally A.B.A. Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project, http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/home.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter A.B.A. Death Penalty Moratorium Project].
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penalty. 10 But the analysis in this Article also demonstrates that "place" matters:
there are large disparities in the decision-making process and in outcomes
depending on the place of prosecution."
12
In general, geographic factors are more significant than racial factors,
but there is substantial correlation among these factors. For instance, defendants in
Missouri's two largest cities-St. Louis and Kansas City-are less likely to face
capital trials and less likely to be sentenced to death than defendants in the rest of
the state.' 3 Notably, crimes in St. Louis and Kansas City are predominately blackon-black, whereas crimes in the rest of the state are predominately white-onwhite.' 4 Thus, consistent with the geographic findings, white defendants who kill
white victims are more likely to face capital charges, and more likely to be
sentenced to death, than black defendants who kill black victims. 15 Geographic
variation alone is problematic because it raises concerns about arbitrariness in the
implementation of capital punishment. However, geographic variation that
combines with intra-race crime and housing demographics to create racial
disparities is even more troubling given the history of racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system.
The racial composition of the jury pool is another way in which both
place and race matter. This study is unique in that it analyzes correlations between
the racial composition of jury pools in different counties and the outcomes of
homicide prosecutions. Compared to the rest of the state, St. Louis and Kansas
City have high percentages of nonwhites in the jury pool. It may not be
coincidental that the localities with a large percentage of nonwhites in the jury
pool are the localities where defendants are least likely to receive a death sentence.
Geography reflects and magnifies demographic and political variations.
Some of these variations are built into our system of government. When
neighboring states have radically different laws-for example when a death
penalty state sits next to a non-death penalty state-this radical difference is a
natural result of our federal system of government. 16 The same is true for
See infra Tables 3.3(A)-(C), 4.3(A)-(C).
10.
These analyses do not adjust for the culpability of the individual, or the
11.
heinousness of the crime. Instead, the project provides a description of the disparities
created across important fault lines by the decisions made by prosecutors, fact finders and
defendants, whether justified by outside factors or not.
See infra Table 4.4.
12.
See infra Table 4.2(A).
13.
Black-on-black homicide accounts for 76% of the homicides in St. Louis
14.
City and 50% of homicides in Jackson County, which contains Kansas City. In the
remaining counties, white-on-white crime constitutes 57% of all of the homicides.
See infra Table 4.3(C). Because of the collinearity between geography and
15.
racial demographics-that the race of defendants and victims is related to where the crime
took place-it is difficult to determine which variable is the driving force behind the
disparities found in this study. The point here, however, is that both types of differences are
important, and implicate the fairness of murder prosecution in Missouri.
A distinctive set of federalism concerns defines overlapping state and federal
16.
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL, § 9-2.031, Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy
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variations in policy, where both states are death penalty states but one state makes
frequent use of the sanction and the other does so only rarely.
Although principles of federalism protect state-to-state variations in the
application of capital punishment, they do not protect county-to-county variation.
While intrastate variation in the application of the law is permissible, or even
warranted, in some situations, 17 it does not follow that county-to-county variation
in death penalty policy is acceptable. For example, while the Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment protections for obscene speech vary in accordance
with local community standards, 18 the implementation of capital punishment raises
life-and-death issues where the stakes are substantially higher than disputes about
obscene speech.' 9 The Supreme Court has never even hinted that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment should be subject to the
vagaries of local community standards.
Nevertheless, this study demonstrates that, in Missouri, local community
standards play a crucial role in the decision-making process that determines
whether a convicted murderer lives or dies. Missouri has 115 counties, each with
its own local prosecutor. The homicide statutes in Missouri grant local prosecutors
broad discretion to make life-and-death decisions, and prosecutors in different
counties exercise that discretion in very different ways. On a national level, there
are 2300 prosecuting authorities in this country, most at the county level. 20 This
study does not address the question of whether the variation across counties in
Missouri is characteristic of intrastate disparities in other states. If Missouri is
typical, death penalty practice varies in systematic ways that call into question the
fairness of the system, despite repeated attempts by the Supreme Court to impose a
measure of national uniformity in the implementation of capital punishment.
("Petite Policy"); see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
CASES, STATUTES & EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 953-54 (3d ed. 2007).
17.
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (theorizing that local variation in policies is an efficient solution to
heterogeneous policy preferences).
18.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).

19.
The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that with stakes, literally, of
life and death, the constitutional concerns with respect to implementation of the death
penalty are heightened. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129
S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (mem.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 238, 276-77 (1972).
20.

See

STEVEN W. PERRY, PROSECUTORS IN STATES COURTS,

2005 1 (2006),

availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf.
21.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (holding that
individuals who were less than eighteen years old at the time of the crime are not eligible
for capital punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting execution
of mentally retarded individuals); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986)
(prohibiting execution of insane people); Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 (requiring that statutory
aggravating circumstances "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (holding that an individual
cannot be sentenced to death "solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber
takes life"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-07 (1978) (statutes must give defendants
broad leeway to present mitigating evidence and plea for mercy); Coker v. Georgia, 433
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The analysis of geographic and racial disparities in homicide prosecution
presented in this Article relies upon a "comprehensive database" of 1046 homicide
cases that includes substantially all of the homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri
over a five-year period that were initially charged as first-degree murder ("M"),
second-degree murder ("M2"), or voluntary manslaughter ("VM"), and that
resulted in a homicide conviction.22 Additionally, 247 cases (the "detailed
database") selected from the comprehensive database were studied in greater
detail.23 We gathered substantial information about cases in the detailed database,
and used this information to investigate the decision-making process in more
depth, with a particular focus on disparate racial impact and interactions with
geographic disparities.
By analyzing data gathered on all cases charged as Ml, M2, or VM, the
study provides a rough measure of how much "work" the statute does in selecting
capital cases from the broader universe of intentional-homicide cases, and how
much of that "work" is left to prosecutorial discretion. At least 76% of the cases in
the comprehensive database are death-eligible under the statute; 24 the other 24%
are not death-eligible. Only 2.5% of the homicide cases yielded sentences of death.
In another 2.5% of the cases, juries or trial judges rejected a capital charge
presented by a prosecutor. In total, only 5% of defendants in Missouri homicide
cases faced a death penalty trial.
Therefore, death penalty-eligible cases in which prosecutors chose not to
pursue capital charges comprise at least 71% of the cases in the comprehensive
database. In rough terms, prosecutors are doing three times as much "work" as the
statute in deciding which cases merit capital punishment, because the statute
eliminated only 24% of the cases from the class of death-eligible offenses, whereas
prosecutors eliminated 71% by electing not to pursue capital charges. These
figures suggest that the Missouri legislature has abdicated its responsibility to
establish statutory limits on capital punishment and delegated that legislative
function to individual prosecutors. More fundamentally, our findings highlight
what may be a critical problem with the administration of capital punishment in
other states, to the extent that homicide statutes in other death penalty states grant
similarly broad discretion to local prosecutors.
One response to the vast discretion prosecutors wield would be to remove
the discretion altogether, making capital punishment mandatory for a certain class
of crimes.25 In Woodson v. North Carolina,the Supreme Court held mandatory
U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that a state cannot impose capital punishment for the rape of
an adult woman).
22.
For a more precise description of the parameters for including cases in the
comprehensive database, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
23.
We created the detailed database with a stratified random sample of
homicide cases, oversampling cases in which the state sought the death penalty at some
point in the prosecution. See infra Appendix II (describing the selection of the detailed
database).
24.
See infra Part II (explaining how this estimate is derived).
25.
Of course, one cannot actually remove prosecutorial discretion altogether;
this change would simply refocus the locus of the discretion to the initial decision to charge
Mi.
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capital punishment unconstitutional, recognizing that discretion is necessary. 26 In
particular, the Court reasoned that discretion was key to the constitutionality of
capital punishment.27 Legislatures, therefore, have a fine line to draw: the Supreme
Court has stated that discretion is an important component of the constitutionality
of the death penalty, but the Court has also held that the death penalty should be
rare, and that the grounds for the death penalty should be narrow by statute.28 This
suggests that legislatures must narrow the reach of the death penalty to a
reasonably small group of the worst homicides, at which point prosecutors may
use their discretion to narrow the field further. One additional point suggests that
legislatures should provide some guidance to prosecutors: the legislative process is
open to the community, and allows input from all constituents. In contrast,
prosecutors make their decisions without direct input from the community; the
closed-door nature of prosecutorial decision-making is particularly troubling in the
context of capital punishment, when the decision has such drastic effects.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I introduces our study, with an
overview of the relevant law and practice in Missouri, focusing on the ways in
which Missouri law defines the scope of prosecutorial discretion and providing an
abbreviated description of our methodology and design. 29 Part II presents a rough
quantitative measurement of the scope of prosecutorial discretion. Part III analyzes
both racial and geographic disparities in charging and conviction rates for MI
versus M2-a key dividing line in homicide prosecution. Part IV investigates the
implementation of the death penalty in Missouri, focusing on geographic and racial
disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes. Part V presents potential policy
implications arising from the study.

I. STUDYING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN MISSOURI
The analysis in this Article provides a statistical snapshot of homicide
cases in Missouri. It does so by measuring the extent of prosecutorial discretion,
and then focusing on how the discretionary decisions of prosecutors correlate with
racial and geographic disparities along the dividing line between Ml and lesser
homicide offenses, and along the divide between death sentences and lesser
sentences. 30 This Part provides a brief overview of the study design and
methodology, with particular attention to the details of Missouri law and how these
details impact the study.

26.
428 U.S. 280, 296-99 (1976).
27.
Id.
28.
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (mem.) (limiting capital
punishment for any crime against a person to those individuals who commit murder); Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879-80 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 298-99 (1972).
29.
A complete description is available infra Appendices I and II.
30.
It bears emphasis, though, that the analysis does not support any conclusions
about causal relationships between prosecutorial decisions and geographic/racial disparities.
Investigation of causal relationships between prosecutorial decisions and different outcomes
requires the introduction of control variables or other statistical techniques and data; that
will be the focus of a subsequent study.
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This study is based on a comprehensive database that includes 1046 cases
that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the initial indictment or information is dated
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001; (2) the defendant was initially
charged with either murder or voluntary manslaughter; 31 and (3) the defendant was
ultimately convicted of a homicide offense.3 2 We divided the cases in the
comprehensive database into two categories: "capital charges" and "noncapital
cases." "Capital charges" are cases in which the prosecutor sought the death
penalty at some point during the prosecution. For example, cases in which the
prosecutor initially charged death, and then later accepted a plea bargain for a
lesser sentence, count as capital charges for these purposes. All other cases in the
database are "noncapital cases." After compiling the comprehensive database, we
selected a "detailed database" of cases to study in greater detail. The detailed
database consists of 247 cases, including 127 capital charges and 120 noncapital
cases.
A. ClassificationofHomicide as Murder
Missouri, like a majority of death penalty states, classifies murder in two
degrees: first-degree murder and second-degree murder. There are only two
permissible punishments for Ml in Missouri: the death penalty, or life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole ("LWOP").33 In contrast,
M2 is punishable as a Class A felony3 4 by ten to thirty years imprisonment, or by
life imprisonment with eligibility for parole.35 Thus, the punishment for MI is
much harsher than the punishment for M2.
Even so, the statutory definitions of Ml and M2 are almost identical. A
defendant commits M2 if he "knowingly causes the death of another person." 36 A
defendant commits MI if he "knowingly causes the death of another person after
deliberation upon the matter., 37 Thus, the deliberation requirement is the only
factor that distinguishes MI from "knowing" second-degree murder. Deliberation
is defined as "cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief., 38 As the
analysis in Appendix I demonstrates, the deliberation requirement is satisfied in
almost every case involving knowing second-degree murder. Therefore, the
primary difference between M I and M2 is the severity of the punishment.

31.
Although cases charged as second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter
are not death-eligible under the statute, these cases are included because prosecutorial
discretion affects the decision whether to charge a case as first-degree murder ("Ml"),
second-degree murder ("M2"), or voluntary manslaughter ("VM"). The analysis in Part III,
infra, demonstrates that many of the cases charged as M2 or VM satisfy the statutory
requirements for an M1 charge and are death-eligible under the statute.
32.
The methodology for creating both the comprehensive and detailed databases
is described in detail infra Appendix II.
33.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.020.2 (2008).
34.
Id. § 565.021.2.
35.
Id. § 558.011.1(1).
36.
Id. § 565.021.1(1). Under Missouri law, felony murder and reckless
homicide are also classified as second-degree murder. See infra Appendix 1.
37.
Id. § 565.020.1.
38.
Id. § 565.002(3).
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Beyond the M1/M2 distinction, prosecutors must prove one or more
statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a death
sentence. 39 The Missouri Penal Code lists seventeen statutory aggravating factors.
This Article uses the following terms to refer to the seventeen statutory
aggravators: prior record, multiple homicide, hazardous device, for money, public
official, agent or employee, wantonly vile, peace officer, escaped custody,
avoiding arrest, felony murder, killing witness, corrections
officer, hijacking,
40
concealing drug crime, other drug crime, and gang activity.
The number and breadth of statutory aggravators in Missouri expands the
class of death-eligible offenses, thereby broadening the scope of prosecutorial
discretion. With seventeen statutory aggravating factors, Missouri ranks eighth
among the thirty-five death penalty states in terms of the number of statutory
aggravators. 4 1 In general, states with a greater number of statutory aggravators give
prosecutors more discretion to decide which cases should be charged as capital
cases. The sheer number of aggravators is only part of the story, though, because
states vary widely in the breadth of individual aggravators. Part III, infra, provides
a more detailed analysis of the broadest statutory aggravators.
B. Design ofthe Study
The main objectives of this study are: (1) to measure the relative
importance of different decision-makers in creating and implementing homicide
and death penalty policy; (2) to analyze correlations between prosecutorial
discretion and disparate impacts on different racial and geographic groups within
Missouri; and (3) to determine the extent to which statutory limitations constrain
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and promote consistent application of
capital punishment across counties. This subsection discusses the methodology and
design of the study. A more detailed discussion of the methodology can be found
in Appendix II.
There are four key methodological issues that studies of this nature must
address: (1) determining the population of cases to be investigated; (2) defining
which cases are "death-eligible"; (3) deciding what source(s) of data to utilize; and
(4) developing measures to control for crime-specific characteristics, where
39.
40.
Appendix I.
41.
(twenty-eight

Id. § 565.030.4(2).
The statutory definitions of all seventeen aggravators are included infra
The only jurisdictions with a larger number of aggravators are: California
aggravators), CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008); Delaware (twenty-

two aggravators), DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (2009); Illinois (twenty-one
aggravators), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b) (2008); Utah (nineteen aggravators), UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1) (2008); Colorado (eighteen aggravators), COLO. REV. STAT. § 181.3-1201(5) (2008); Oregon (eighteen aggravators), OR. REV. STAT. §163.095(1)-(2)
(2007); and Pennsylvania (eighteen aggravators), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d) (2008).
With seventeen aggravators, Missouri is tied with Florida, FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (2008),

in eighth place among the thirty-five death penalty states. For the forty-two federal offenses
that may trigger the death penalty, see Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Federal Laws Providing for
the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-laws-providing-death-penalty
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
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appropriate, that properly inform the charging and sentencing decisions. With
respect to the first point, the present study investigates a population of cases that
includes substantially all of the intentional-homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri
over a five-year period. We adopt this inclusive approach to reduce selection bias
in the final database; it is necessary to include all cases that could have been death
penalty cases, or Ml cases, in order to compare the charging practices of
prosecutors in different counties. If this study excluded cases not charged as
capital cases, it would risk vastly understating the importance of the prosecutor's
charging decisions. Recent comprehensive studies have adopted a similar
approach, although some studies focus only on cases charged as capital cases.42
Regarding the second methodological choice, this study uses a probable
cause standard to determine which cases are death-eligible. 3 Prior studies
generally use a more conservative standard for assessing death eligibility. For
example, the Maryland Study requires clear evidence that the crime satisfies all the
statutory requirements for capital punishment. 44 This study uses the lower
"probable cause" standard because that is the only legal requirement necessary to
indict for Ml and to seek the death penalty. Although prosecutors must prove the
case beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, most cases end in plea bargaining.
With respect to the third design issue, this study uses a variety of data
sources to investigate cases in the detailed database, including police investigative
reports, FBI records of criminal histories, court records, newspaper articles, and
appellate decisions. The goal is to recreate as closely as possible the data available
to the prosecutor at the time the prosecutor makes initial charging and pleabargaining decisions. In contrast, other studies gather facts from records created
later in the process, notably pre-sentencing reports and trial transcripts. This study
did not rely upon trial transcripts because most of the cases in the study were
46
45
resolved by plea agreements. Despite the advantages of presentencing reports
this study excluded them as well because Missouri prosecutors often do not have
this information when making pretrial decisions. Hence, the information would not
explain any of the charging and plea-bargaining decisions made before trial, which
are the central focus of this study.

42.
See, e.g., A.B.A. Death Penalty Moratorium Project, supra note 9.
43.
Specifically, a crime initially charged as M2 or VM is "Mi-eligible" if a
prosecutor could make a good-faith, reasonable argument that the statutory requirements for
MI are satisfied. Additionally, all crimes charged as MI are deemed Mi-eligible. An Mleligible crime in which the prosecution did not seek death is "death-eligible" if the
prosecution could make a good-faith, reasonable argument that one or more statutory
aggravating factors are present. Additionally, all cases charged as capital crimes are deemed
death-eligible.
44.
See Maryland Study, supra note 4, at 15-16.
45.
In the comprehensive database, 61.3% were resolved by plea agreements;
similarly, 55.5% of the cases in the detailed database were resolved by plea agreements.
46.
Presentencing reports have advantages when focusing solely on the decision
whether to sentence an individual to death, because they provide more balanced information
about mitigating and aggravating factors, similar to what would be presented in a death
penalty trial.
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Our final design decision was to focus on disparate impact, rather than
causality. Because of this, the study does not control for culpability. Instead, it
focuses on the racial and geographic disparities associated with prosecutorial
decision-making. These disparities may be justified by other factors, but they exist
nonetheless, and inform our judgment of how the criminal justice system works.
Disparate impact is of primary importance in policy discussions because it affects
perceptions of fairness, bias, and legitimacy. We plan to do a separate study that
examines causal relationships between prosecutorial decision-making and racial
and geographic disparities.
C. Analytical Methodology
The analysis in the remainder of this Article is divided into three parts.
Part II measures the extent to which statutory constraints limit the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, concluding that prosecutorial
discretion is largely unconstrained by the statutory scheme created by the Missouri
legislature. Part III provides unadjusted measures of geographic and racial
disparities in the decision-making process that determines which defendants are
convicted of Ml, and which defendants are convicted of lesser included offenses.47
Part IV provides unadjusted measures of geographic and racial disparities in the
decision-making process that determines which defendants are sentenced to death.
As Parts III and IV demonstrate, the unconstrained discretion that prosecutors
wield leads to significant geographic and racial disparities in charging, conviction,
and sentencing patterns in Missouri.
To provide measures of geographic disparities, this Article analyzes the
complete universe of cases in the comprehensive database because, for every case
in the comprehensive database, the database contains information about the county
of origin and the decisions made in each stage of the decision process. To provide
measures of racial disparities, we derive estimates from the detailed database
because information about race of victims and race of defendants is available only
for cases in the detailed database. Those estimates are based on a weighted average
that accounts for the sampling method employed.48

II. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Prosecutorial discretion is a key component of our criminal justice
system. Prosecutorial discretion allows for individualized application of general
laws, allows prosecutors to tailor application of the laws to the specific
community, and is a necessary part of our justice system, given the need to
prioritize prosecutions to conserve scarce resources. But unfettered prosecutorial
discretion is harmful as well: there are significant dangers in arbitrary and
prejudicial application of the law. The secrecy of prosecutorial decision-making
exacerbates these concerns, making discriminatory application of the law, for
example, much more difficult to discover. Given these dangers, it is key for the
47.
The term "unadjusted measures" means that these measures do not control
for the culpability of individual defendants.
48.
See infra Appendix IIfor more details.
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legislature to provide significant guidance to prosecutors to channel their
discretion appropriately. In Zant v. Stephens, the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of a legislative check on prosecutorial discretion in the death penalty
context. 49 But the death penalty is only the final decision in a homicide
prosecution; equally important is the initial decision to charge Ml.
As mentioned above, this Article defines the term "Mi-eligible" to mean
that a reasonably aggressive prosecutor could make a good-faith, reasonable
argument that the statutory requirements for an MI charge are satisfied. The study
defines the term "death-eligible" to mean that a reasonably aggressive prosecutor
could make a good-faith, reasonable argument that the statutory requirements for a
capital charge are satisfied. Part II of this Article analyzes cases that were initially
charged as M2 or VM to derive an estimate of the percentage of cases in the
comprehensive database that are Mi-eligible. Similarly, this study analyzes cases
that were not charged as capital cases to derive an estimate of the percentage of
cases in the comprehensive database that are death-eligible. The estimates of the
percentage of cases that are MI-eligible and death-eligible provide a rough
quantitative measure of the extent to which statutory constraints limit the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
A. First-Degree Versus Second-Degree Murder
Using conservative assumptions, approximately 62% of the cases in the
comprehensive database that were initially charged as M2 or VM satisfy the
statutory requirements for an MI charge. Overall, an estimated 84.5% of the cases
in the comprehensive database are MI-eligible under the statute.
There are 1046 cases in the comprehensive database, including 617 cases
initially charged as Ml, and 429 cases initially charged as M2 or VM. To
determine how many of the 429 cases charged as M2 or VM are MI-eligible, it is
necessary to extrapolate from the cases in the detailed database because we do not
have sufficient information about all the cases in the comprehensive database.
There are 247 cases in the detailed database, including sixty-one cases that were
initially charged as either M2 or VM. Two law professors independently reviewed
the files for all sixty-one cases that were initially charged as either M2 or VM to
determine which cases were Ml-eligible. For each case, each professor answered
either "yes" or "no" to the question of whether the case was MI-eligible. There
were thirty-eight cases that both professors agreed are M- 1 eligible, and fifty-three
cases that at least one professor thought was Mi-eligible. Conservatively, using
only the thirty-eight cases for which both professors agreed, 50 62.3% of the cases
49.
462 U.S. 862, 876 n.15 (1983) (recognizing "the need for legislative criteria
to limit the death penalty to certain crimes"). Zant focuses on the legislative check on the
prosecutor's power; it specifically endorses the Georgia system of undirected jury decisionmaking. Id. at 880 (noting that "the absence of legislative or court-imposed standards to
govern the jury in weighing the significance of either or both of those aggravating
circumstances does not render the Georgia capital-sentencing statute invalid as applied in
this case").
50.
If one uses the higher figure of fifty-three cases that at least one professor
thought were Ml-eligible, this would suggest that 86.9% of the cases initially charged as
M2 or VM are Ml-eligible.
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in the detailed database that were initially charged as M2 or VM are Mi-eligible
under the statute. 51 Assuming that 100% of the cases in the comprehensive
database that were initially charged as MI are Mi-eligible under the statute, and
assuming that 62.3% of the cases that were initially charged as M2 or VM are Ml eligible under the statute, 84.5% of the intentional homicide cases prosecuted in
Missouri are MI-eligible under the statute. 2
Figure 2.1 compares the influence of the statute to the influence of
prosecutorial discretion in determining which cases yield MI convictions. Given
that 84.5% of the intentional-homicide cases prosecuted in Missouri are Mleligible under the statute, it follows that the statute eliminates only about 15.5% of
the cases from the class of Mi-eligible offenses. Prosecutors filed MI charges in
'only 69.8% of the MI-eligible cases.

51.
Because we are extrapolating from a subsample of data, there is additional
error in this estimate. To be precise, the conservative estimate is that 62% ± 12% are Mieligible.
52.
Incorporating the error in the original 62.3% estimate, our conservative
estimate is that 84.5% ± 5.8% of the cases in the comprehensive database are MI-eligible. If
one used the more liberal estimate that fifty-three out of sixty-one M2/VM cases in the
detailed database are Ml-eligible, a similar calculation yields the estimate that about 94.6%
of the cases in the comprehensive database are Ml-eligible.
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Schematic of M1-M2 Decision Tree

In effect, prosecutors eliminated 30.2% of the Mi-eligible cases by
choosing not to file an M1 charge. Moreover, prosecutors eliminated 47.8% of the
cases initially charged as M1 by voluntarily reducing the MI charge. 3 Overall,
53.
The vast majority of cases in which prosecutors withdrew M1 charges were
resolved by guilty pleas. Indeed, 284 out of 295 cases in this group were resolved by guilty
pleas. The other eleven cases in this category are cases where the prosecutor filed an
amended information before trial to reduce the charge from Ml to M2.
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discretionary choices by prosecutors eliminated about 53.7% of the intentionalhomicide cases from the MI category, 54 whereas the statute eliminated only about
15.5% of the cases from the Ml category. Thus, prosecutors do about 3.5 times
more "work" than the statute in narrowing the class of intentional-homicide cases
to yield M1 convictions.
It is worth noting that the minimum penalty for an MI conviction is
harsher than the maximum penalty for an M2 conviction. The statute provides only
two possible sentences for a defendant convicted of Ml: death, or life without
parole. 55 In contrast, the maximum penalty for a defendant convicted of M2 is life
with parole, and the minimum penalty is ten years' imprisonment.5 6 About onefourth of the cases in the comprehensive database were M1 convictions; the
remaining defendants were convicted of lesser included offenses.57 The 241 Ml
convictions yielded twenty-six death sentences (11%) and 215 LWOP sentences
(89%). In contrast, the 805 cases where defendants were convicted of lesser
included offenses yielded 151 life sentences and 651 fixed-term sentences. 5s The
average sentence for defendants sentenced to a term of years was 15.8 years. Thus,
prosecutors' charging and plea-bargaining decisions drastically alter the potential
sentencing landscape that a defendant faces.
There is a huge difference in sentencing outcomes between defendants
convicted of Ml and defendants convicted of lesser included offenses. Despite that
difference, the statute gives prosecutors extremely broad discretion to choose
which defendants should be convicted of Ml, and which defendants should be
convicted of lesser offenses. Effectively, the Missouri statute delegates to
prosecutors the legislative task of determining which types of homicide merit
harsher punishment. This, in turn, means that 115 county prosecutors are making
separate decisions regarding charging practices, which leads to significant
geographic and racial disparities.
To address this issue, the Missouri legislature could amend the statutory
definition of "deliberation" to require evidence of advance planning or a
preconceived design; this is the approach adopted by California, Arizona, West
Virginia, and other states. 59 We estimate that only 15% of the cases initially
charged as M2 or VM would be M I-eligible under the revised statute, compared to
at least 62.3% under the existing statute, and about 60% of the cases initially
charged as MI would remain Ml-eligible. Overall, we estimate that only 36% of
the cases in the comprehensive database would be Ml-eligible under the revised

54.
(267+295)/1046= .537
55.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.020.2 (2008).
56.
See id.
§§ 565.021.2, 558.011.1(1).
57.
This figure includes 542 M2 convictions, 138 voluntary-manslaughter
convictions, and 125 convictions for other offenses, most of which were involuntary
manslaughter.
58.
The comprehensive database includes three cases where defendants were
convicted of M2, but we lack information about sentencing outcomes.
59.
See infra Appendix I. This would reinstate the plain meaning of the statute's
current language, rather than the somewhat strained interpretation of "deliberation" that the
Missouri Supreme Court has applied.
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statute, compared to at least 84.5% under the current statute. 60 Hence, this type of
statutory amendment would significantly constrain prosecutorial discretion in
choosing which cases to charge as M l and which cases to charge as M2.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Choice Between Life and Death
The study also finds that prosecutors have immense discretion when
determining in which cases to seek the death penalty. The detailed database
contains a total of 247 cases; under the most liberal assumptions, the detailed
database includes 239 cases that are Mi-eligible. 61 Those 239 cases include 127
capital charges and 112 noncapital cases. One or more statutory aggravating
factors are present in ninety-nine of the 112 Mi-eligible cases that were not
charged as capital cases. 62 Thus, 88.4% of the Mi-eligible, noncapital cases in the
detailed database are death-eligible under the current statute. This represents a
conservative estimate of the percentage of Mi-eligible cases that are death-eligible
under the statute.
Table 2.1 displays two different estimates of the percentage of deatheligible cases in the comprehensive database derived from the 88.4% figure of
death-eligible cases. Part II.A, supra, provides a conservative estimate that 84.5%
of the cases in the comprehensive database are M1-eligible.63 In addition, as a
more liberal estimate, as many as 94.6% of the cases may be MI-eligible. 64 Using
the conservative figure, approximately 76.2% of the intentional-homicide cases

60.
These estimates are derived as follows. Two law professors reviewed the
files for every case in the detailed database. For each case, each professor answered "yes" or
"no" to the question whether a reasonably aggressive prosecutor could make a good-faith
charge of MI under a California-type statute. We divided the results into three categories:
cases charged as MI capital charges, cases charged as Ml noncapital cases, and cases
charged as M2 or VM. We assumed that, for each of these three categories, the percentage
of cases that would be Mi-eligible under the revised statute is the same for the
comprehensive database as it is for the detailed database when properly accounting for our
sampling design. Based on that assumption, we estimated the number of comprehensive
database cases in each category that would be Ml-eligible under the revised statute, and
derived an estimate for the comprehensive database as a whole on that basis. The
conservative estimate uses only those cases that both professors agreed would be Mleligible; the liberal estimate uses those cases where at least one of the professors believed
the case to be Mi-eligible.
61.
As discussed above, two law professors independently analyzed the sixtyone detailed database cases that were initially charged as M2 or VM to ascertain which ones
were not MI-eligible. See supra Part II.A. There were only eight cases that both professors
agreed were not M 1-eligible. For present purposes, we assume that those eight cases are not
M 1-eligible, and all the others are M I-eligible. Subtracting those eight cases from the total
of 247 detailed database cases, we assume that the detailed database contains 239 Mleligible cases.
62.
The figure of ninety-nine cases is derived from the data compiled on the
aggravator forms described infra Appendix II. An aggravator is present in a case if the
prosecutor actually charged that aggravator, or if the prosecutor could make a good-faith,
reasonable decision to charge that aggravator.
63.
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
64.
See supra note 60.
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prosecuted in Missouri are death-eligible under the statute. If one uses the more
liberal figure, about 85.2% of the intentional-homicide cases are death-eligible. 5
Table 2.1
Conservative Estimate

Liberal Estimate

Mi-Eligible
Under Statute

84.5%

94.6%

Death-Eligible
Under Statute

76.2%

85.2%

M I-Eligible, but Not
Death-Eligible

8.3%

9.5%

Figure 2.2 illustrates the process by means of which defendants sentenced
to death are selected from the class of death-eligible defendants. This Figure uses
the conservative estimate that 76.2% of the intentional-homicide cases prosecuted
in Missouri are death-eligible under the statute. Prosecutors filed capital charges in
only 16.7% of the death-eligible cases. Moreover, prosecutors withdrew the capital
66
charge in more than 60% of the cases that were initially charged as capital cases.
Overall, only fifty-three cases resulted in capital trials, 67 and juries returned death
verdicts in only twenty-six of those cases. In sum, in the process of generating
twenty-six death verdicts out of 1046 cases, the statute eliminated about 24% of
the cases from the class of death-eligible offenses, prosecutors eliminated about
71% of the cases from the pool, and juries weeded out only 2.6% of the cases.
Thus, discretionary choice by individual prosecutors is the dominant factor
shaping decisions about who will live and who will die.68

65.
These estimates assume that 100% of the capital charges in the
comprehensive database are death-eligible under the statute, and 88.4% of the Ml-eligible
noncapital cases are death-eligible.
66.
Prosecutors withdrew capital charges in eighty of the 133 cases that were
initially charged as capital cases. Those eighty cases include sixty-four cases resolved by
guilty pleas, eleven cases that were tried before a judge (after the capital charge was
withdrawn), and five cases that were tried before a jury (after the capital charge was
withdrawn).
The fifty-three capital trials include four bench trials and forty-nine jury
67.
trials. The forty-nine jury trials include four cases where a prosecutor charged death and
presented an M l charge to a jury, but the jury returned a verdict of M2 or VM. Those cases
are counted as "capital trials" even though the cases never reached a penalty phase.
Similarly, the four bench trials include three cases where a prosecutor charged death and
presented an M1 charge to a judge in a bench trial, but the judge returned a verdict of M2.
Those cases are also counted as capital trials even though the cases never reached a penalty
phase. Finally, the "capital trial" category includes one case from Jackson County where the
parties agreed to conduct penalty-phase proceedings before a judge, instead of a jury.
68.
Of course, prosecutors make decisions partly based upon their understanding
of how a jury would react. This fact does not negate the significant amount of discretionary
power that prosecutors hold.
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Figure 2.2:
Schmatic of Decision Tree for Death or Lesser Sentence

C. The Narrowing Effects of Statutory Aggravating Factors
The purpose of statutory aggravators is to significantly narrow the
immense discretion that prosecutors wield in making decisions to seek the death
penalty and juries wield in making decisions to impose the death penalty. 69 Table
2.1 demonstrates that the statutory aggravators in Missouri fail in this goal.
Specifically, Table 2.1 provides the percentage of cases in the comprehensive
69.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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database that are M I-eligible, but not death-eligible, measuring the extent to which
the statutory aggravators narrow the class of death-eligible offenses.
Conservatively, the requirement to prove one or more statutory aggravators
eliminates only 8.3% of the total cases from the class of death-eligible offenses.7 °
Alternatively, using a more liberal estimate of Mi-eligibility, it follows that the
requirement to prove a statutory aggravator eliminates about 9.5% of the total
cases from the class of death-eligible offenses. In light of these figures, it is
doubtful whether the Missouri statute satisfies the constitutional requirement,
articulated in Zant v. Stephens, that aggravating circumstances "must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.'
The failure of Missouri's statutory aggravators to narrow the class of
death-eligible offenses is primarily attributable to two factors. First, the sheer
number of statutory aggravators tends to broaden the class of death-eligible
offenses. Second, there are six aggravating factors that are quite broad in
application, and therefore exacerbate this effect: wantonly vile, felony murder,
killing witness, avoiding arrest, for money, and agent/employee. 72 Table 2.2
summarizes the application of Missouri's statutory aggravating factors, listing the
seventeen aggravating factors ranked in terms of the number of cases in which a
particular aggravator is present.

70.

The 8.3% estimate shown in Table 2.1 is derived as follows. The top row in

Table 2.1 is the percentage of cases that are M- 1 eligible under the statute. The second row
is the percentage of cases that are death-eligible. The difference between these two figures
is the percentage of cases that are M-1 eligible but not death-eligible. Due to rounding, the
percentages in the right-hand column do not precisely total 100%.

71.
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Zant did not articulate a specific measure for
"narrowness" of a statute. However, excluding fewer than 10% of cases is well within the
range of statutes with which Zant was concerned.
72.
See infra Appendix I for statutory definitions of these aggravators.
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Table 2.2:
73
Application of Statutory Aggravating Factors
Prosecutor

Prosecutor Could Aggravator Present

Actually
Charged

Have, but Did Not
Charge

("PAC")

("CHC")

("PAC" + "CHC")

(n = 108)

(n = 239)

(n = 239)

Wantonly Vile

94

125

219(91.6%)

Felony Murder

67

58

125 (52.3%)

Killing Witness

33

86

119 (49.8%)

Avoiding Arrest

28

88

116 (48.5%)

For Money

51

56

107(44.8%)

Agent/Employee

22

76

98 (41.0%)

Multiple Homicide

34

21

55 (23.0%)

Prior Record

30

22

52 (21.8%)

Hazardous Device

12

21

33 (13.8%)

Conceal Drug Crime

3

5

8 (3.3%)

Escape Custody

5

2

7 (2.9%)

Gang Activity

1

5

6 (2.5%)

Peace Officer

6

0

6 (2.5%)

Public Official

3

3

6 (2.5%)

Other Drug Crime

1

4

5(2.1%)

Corrections Officer

1

4

5 (2.1%)

Hijacking

0

0

0

Aggravator

As Table 2.2 demonstrates, the single broadest aggravating factor is the
"wantonly vile" aggravator, which was present in over 90% of all Ml-eligible
cases. The Missouri Supreme Court has construed this factor so broadly that there
73.
Although there are 127 capital charges in the detailed database, there are
only 108 cases for which we obtained information about the actual charging of aggravators.
The figures in the PAC column reflect the actual usage of aggravators in those 108 cases.
The column labeled "could have charged" indicates the number of cases in which the
prosecutor could make a good-faith, reasonable argument in support of a decision to charge
that aggravator, but did not; it therefore does not include the cases in which the prosecutor
actually charged that aggravator. The right-hand column shows the percentage of Mleligible cases in which particular aggravating factors are present.
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are very few Ml-eligible murders that do not satisfy the "wantonly vile"
aggravator. The court has approved the application of this aggravator in cases
involving multiple injuries to the victim; a series of attacks directed at the
victim; 75 a period of time in which the victim is aware
of his/her impending
77
death;76 and where a victim was bound prior to the killing.
Apart from the "wantonly vile" aggravator, the two most frequently
charged aggravators are the "felony murder" and "for money" aggravators,
charged in sixty-seven and fifty-one cases, respectively. These two aggravators
tend to broaden the class of death-eligible offenses because the statutory
provisions, on their face, apply to most of the Mi-eligible homicides committed in
Missouri. In fact, at least one of the two factors is present in about 60% of the Mleligible cases. 78 For instance prosecutors often charge both aggravators in cases
where the defendant commits robbery and/or burglary in conjunction with the
murder.79 The felony murder aggravator also applies to cases involving rape,
sodomy, kidnapping, and certain drug crimes. 80 The "for money" aggravator also
applies in cases where the defendant kills the victim to obtain an inheritance and in
murder-for-hire cases. 81
Two additional statutory aggravating factors-the "killing witness" and
"avoiding arrest" aggravators-are present in almost 50% of the Ml-eligible

74.
See, e.g., State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 710 (Mo. 2004).
75.
See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1981).
76.
See, e.g., State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Mo. 2002); State v. McMillin,
783 S.W.2d 82, 103 (Mo. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Morgan v. Illinois, 543
U.S. 719 (1992).
77.
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo. 1995); McMillin, 783
S.W.2d at 103. The court has also approved the application of this aggravator in cases
where the defendant was motivated by pecuniary gain, see, e.g., State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d

184, 197 (Mo. 2005); the defendant manifested a lack of remorse, see, e.g., State v. Griffin,
756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. 1988); State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. 1984); the victim
was chosen at random, see, e.g., State v. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d 468, 483-84 (Mo. 1999);
State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 382 (Mo. 1988); and the murder was one of a series of
murders, see, e.g., State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 442 (Mo. 2002).

78.

The "felony murder" aggravator is present in 52.3% of the cases. The "for

money" aggravator is present in 44.8% of the cases. See supra Table 2.2. However, there is
not a perfect overlap between the two aggravators. There are a total of eighty-nine cases in
which both factors are present. Additionally, there are fifty-four other cases in which one of
the two factors is present. Thus, at least one of the two factors is present in 143 out of 239
cases, or about 59.8% of the M I-eligible cases.
79.
Prosecutors charged the "felony murder" aggravator in forty out of fifty-one
cases where they charged the "for money" aggravator.
80.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(11) (2008) ("The murder in the first degree was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or
encouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any degree of
rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195,
RSMo.").
81.
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593, 604-05 (Mo. 1991) (inheritance);
State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141, 149 (Mo. 1984) (murder for hire).
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cases. 82 While the statutory language suggests that these are two distinct
aggravators, s3 in practice, the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted them as
coextensive. 84 Thus, for example, if a defendant robs a victim, and then kills the
victim one minute later, the court says that both aggravators are present because
the victim was a witness to his own robbery, and the defendant killed the victim to
avoid arrest for the robbery. 5
Rounding out the list of the six broadest aggravators, the "agent or
employee" aggravator is present in about 41% of the Ml-eligible cases. The
Missouri Supreme Court has upheld the application of this aggravator in murderfor-hire situations, 86 and in cases where the defendant killed the victim in response
to the verbal encouragement of a co-defendant.8 7 Prosecutors have charged this
aggravator in cases where there is a conspiracy to commit murder, including cases
that do not involve a typical agency or employment relationship between codefendants. 88 In practice, this aggravator applies to any case where two co-

82.
The "killing witness" aggravator is present in 49.8% of the cases. The
avoiding arrest aggravator is present in 48.5% of the cases. See supra Table 2.2.
83.
The "killing witness" aggravator applies to any case where "the murdered
individual was a witness or potential witness in any past or pending investigation .... "Mo.
REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(12). The "avoiding arrest" aggravator applies where the murder
"was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful
arrest .... "Id. § 565.032.2(10).
84.
The "avoiding arrest" aggravator is present in 115 out of 119 cases where the
"killing witness" aggravator is present. Similarly, the "killing witness" aggravator is present
in 115 out of 116 cases where the "avoiding arrest" aggravator is present.
85.
See, e.g., State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 767-68 (Mo. 1997) (upholding
application of "killing witness" aggravator in a robbery/murder case); State v. Brown, 902
S.W.2d 278, 294 (Mo. 1995) (upholding application of both "killing witness" and "avoiding
arrest" aggravators in kidnapping/murder case); State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 68-70
(Mo. 1989) (upholding application of "avoiding arrest" aggravator in a robbery/murder
case).
86.
See, e.g., State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 359-62 (Mo. 1997).
87.
See, e.g., State v. Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Mo. 2000) (after two codefendants robbed a restaurant and forced victim to hand over money from a safe, one codefendant shot victim in response to verbal encouragement from the other co-defendant).
88.
For example, in detailed database case numbers 5002 and 5003 the two codefendants conspired to kill and rob the victim. They lured the victim to the defendant's
residence and beat the victim to death with a bat. The prosecutor sought death and charged
the "agent/employee" aggravator against both defendants. Prosecutors also charged this
aggravator in a case where two co-defendants jointly committed a nonhomicide offense, and
one of the co-defendants subsequently killed the victim, contrary to the express wishes of
the other co-defendant. In detailed database case numbers 1702 and 1705, two codefendants conspired to assault a victim. After beating the victim until he was probably
unconscious, defendant 1702 set the victim's house on fire, contrary to the express wishes
of defendant 1705. The victim was alive when the fire started but died from carbon
monoxide poisoning caused by the fire. The prosecutor brought capital charges and charged
the "agent/employee" aggravator against both defendants.
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defendants jointly commit 89a crime that results in death, even if they did not
conspire to commit murder.
Under the current statute, 100% of the capital charges in the
comprehensive database are death-eligible. An estimated 88.4% of the Mleligible, noncapital cases are death-eligible under the current statute. Overall,
about 76.2% of intentional homicides are death-eligible. If the legislature amended
the statute by eliminating the six broadest statutory aggravating factors, the
percentage of death-eligible cases would decline dramatically. Under the revised
statute, we estimate that only 58% of the capital charges in the comprehensive
database would be death-eligible, and only 37% of the Mi-eligible, noncapital
cases would be death-eligible.90 Overall, we estimate that only 40% of the Mleligible cases in the comprehensive database would be death-eligible under the
revised statute. This would be one method to narrow prosecutorial discretion and
satisfy the constitutional requirement articulated in Zant v. Stephens, although
there are other possible strategies. We outline some possible amendments, based
upon our analysis, at the end of this Article.
In sum, under the current statute, statutory aggravating factors eliminate
91
only about 8-10% of the cases from the class of death-eligible offenses.
Consequently, approximately 88.4% of the Ml-eligible, noncapital cases are
death-eligible under ihe statute, and about 76.2% of the total cases are deatheligible under the statute. 92 Under this statutory scheme, the Missouri legislature
has arguably abdicated its responsibility to "make the law" governing capital
punishment and delegated that responsibility to individual prosecutors. A revised
statute, with a smaller number of narrowly drawn aggravating factors, would shift
the locus of decision-making from prosecutors to legislators and would provide
one way to satisfy the constitutional requirement that aggravating circumstances
"must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty."9 3

III. DISPARATE IMPACT IN HOMICIDE CASES
Having provided a rough measure of the scope of prosecutorial discretion
in Part II, this Part turns to an investigation of how prosecutors use their discretion.
Overall, M1 charging and conviction rates vary drastically across prosecutors,
creating large differences in MI charging and conviction rates across defendants
89.
The defendants do, however, have to satisfy the specific intent requirement
for Ml, because felony murder is an M2 charge unless there was a specific intent to kill the
victim. See infra Appendix I.
90.
These figures are derived from aggravator data coded into our detailed
database. See infra Appendix II. For each case in the detailed database, the file records one
of three possible entries for each of the seventeen statutory aggravators: the prosecutor
actually charged ("PAC") that aggravator, the prosecutor could have charged ("CHC") that
aggravator but did not, or there is no evidence ("NE") to support that aggravator. We
determine whether a case is death-eligible under this alternative scenario by deleting the six
aggravators and then determining whether a prosecutor did or could have charged at least
one of the remaining aggravators.
91.
See supra Table 2.2.
92.
See supra Part II.B.
93.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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when grouped by geographic region or by racial demographic. The Missouri
homicide statute gives prosecutors extremely broad discretion to choose which
defendants should be convicted of MI and which defendants should be convicted
of lesser included offenses. At the same time, there are substantial differences in
sentencing outcomes between defendants convicted of MI and defendants
convicted of lesser included offenses.94 This combination of factors-broad
discretion and substantial differences in sentencing outcomes-raises questions of
uniformity: does the exercise of discretion by different prosecutors affect different
groups of people in significantly different ways?
Beyond uniformity, there is the further question of disparate impact:
which group(s) are most affected by the differences? Given society's history of
racial discrimination, particularly in the criminal justice system, a racial pattern in
sentencing outcomes is disturbing. This study investigates the disparate impact
across race-of-defendant and race-of-victim. A disparate impact of prosecutors'
decisions on particular racial groups would question the cost of the broad
discretion Missouri affords prosecutors now. In addition to disparate impact, the
study also investigates the interplay between race and the death penalty by
determining whether the decisions made correlate with the racial composition of
the jury pool. One hypothesis is that racial tension leads to heightened use of the
death penalty and other harsh sentences, particularly in interracial crimes. The
study finds evidence consistent with this theory, although a causal analysis would
be needed to test the theory directly.

94.

See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 327 2009

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:305

Itentonl
Figure 3.1
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M1 Trial
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I

I
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Guilty Plea

Jury/Judge
Convicts of MI

Lesser Charge

Convictions

In order to describe the decision-making process that the study analyzes,
Figure 3.1 depicts this process for MI convictions versus lesser included offenses.
This Part examines racial and geographic disparities at different points in that
decision-making process, focusing on the four decision points identified in Figure
3.1, as well as the M I outcomes at the bottom of the picture. Section A examines
geographic disparities, and Section B analyzes racial disparities. Section C
presents the results of a regression analysis that examines the interactions among
these two sets of variables.
Throughout Part III, the data tables have column headings identical to the
headings in Table 3.1 below. The headings of Columns 1-4 correspond to the
points labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 3.1. In Table 3.1, the percentages in the top
row are based upon the comprehensive database and are therefore unweighted. The
percentages in the bottom row are based on weighted averages in the detailed
database, as explained in Appendix II. The number in parentheses in each cell is
the number of cases upon which the percentage in that cell is based.
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Table 3.1
Pros.
Charge
dM1

Pros.
Withdrew
M1
Charge

Pros.
Took
Ml
Charge
to Trial

Jury
Convict.
of
Lesser
Charge

M1
Convict.
After
M1
Charge

Total
Ml
Convict

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1046 Cases)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

Detailed
Database
(247 Cases)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

Comprehens.
Database

The percentages in Columns 1-4 are calculated on the basis of the
previous node in the decision tree. Thus, the percentage in the top row of Column
1 means that prosecutors filed an M1 charge in 59% of all intentional-homicide
cases. The percentage in the top row of Column 2 means that prosecutors withdrew
the M1 charge in 47.8% of the cases that were charged as Ml. Because Column 3
corresponds to the third decision point in Figure 3.1, the denominator of the
fraction in Column 3 is the number of cases charged as Ml. Similarly, the
denominator of the fraction in Column 4 is the number of cases in which
prosecutors pursued an M1 charge at trial.
Columns 5 and 6 display two different percentages. For both percentages,
the numerator is the sum of all MI convictions, including M1 guilty pleas and MI
jury verdicts, which is the darker shaded area in Figure 3.1. The denominator for
the percentage in Column 5 is the number of cases in which the prosecutor filed an
M1 charge. The denominator for the percentage in Column 6 is the universe of all
intentional-homicide cases. All the remaining tables in Part IV use the same format
to analyze geographic and racial disparities. Table 3.1 also demonstrates that the
detailed database reasonably represents the large sample, which is consistent with
the sampling methodology of this study.
A. Geographic Disparity
The broad discretion afforded prosecutors in Missouri translates directly
into disparities in outcomes across different geographic regions. Specifically, the
study finds that defendants charged in Jackson County are significantly less likely
to be charged or convicted of Ml, and that jury pool demographics are also
correlated to M1 charging and conviction rates. Defendants who face almost
exclusively white jury pools are charged with M1 more often, but are then
convicted of M1 less often. Tables 3.2(A) to 3.2(C) present more detailed findings
on geographic disparity in the process for deciding which defendants are convicted
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of Ml. In all three tables, St. Louis City and Jackson County (Kansas City) 95 are
treated as separate geographic units. Table 3.2(A) divides the other Missouri
counties into two groups: Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("MSA") and rural.96
Table 3.2(B) divides the other Missouri counties into three groups according to the
percentage of the nonwhite people included in the jury pool. 97 Table 3.2(C)
combines these measures by dividing the other Missouri counties in both ways:
rural vs. MSA and high vs. low percentage of nonwhites in the jury pool, thus
presenting the results from the interaction of jury pool demographics and rural vs.
MSA. In each column, we also98 note the statistical significance of the pattern of
percentages across that column.
Several features in Table 3.2(A) are noteworthy. First, prosecutors in
Jackson County charged M1 at a much lower rate than prosecutors in the rest of
the state. Jackson County prosecutors charged Ml in only 28.9% of the
intentional-homicide cases they prosecuted. In contrast, prosecutors in St. Louis
City charged M1 in 85.5% of their intentional-homicide cases. Apart from Jackson
County, prosecutors in every other geographic category had an M1 charging rate
above 50%, with a statewide average of 59.0%. The difference across regions is
highly statistically significant. Given the low MI charging rate in Jackson County,
it is not surprising that prosecutors in that county secured Ml convictions at a
much lower rate than the rest of the state. Only 10.5% of the Jackson County cases
yielded MI convictions, compared to a statewide average of 23.0%.

95.
Jackson County includes some areas that are outside the geographic limits of
Kansas City, but Kansas City accounts for the bulk of the population and land area of
Jackson County.
96.
As defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, any county with a population density
of at least 1000 people per square mile is part of an MSA. Aside from St. Louis City and
Jackson County, there are twenty counties in Missouri that are within an MSA. MSA
counties in Missouri include some small cities (such as Springfield and Columbia) and some
suburban counties near St. Louis and Kansas City.
97.
We use Census 2000 data to determine the percentage of nonwhite adults in
each county. Unfortunately, we cannot limit the sample to citizens, as these data are not
available, and so our estimate of the percentage of nonwhite jurors may be biased if
immigrants are more likely to be nonwhite than the general public. Missouri does not have a
large immigrant population, so this bias is likely to be small.
98.
Consistent with standard statistical practice, "NS" signifies "Not
Significant"; "+" signifies a p-value of 0.10 or less; "*" indicates a p-value of 0.05 or less;
"**" indicates a p-value of 0.01 or less; and "***" indicates a p-value of 0.001 or less. A

p-value is a measure of how likely it is that one would obtain results at least as skewed as
those shown even if the differences were, in fact, simply random variation. A p-value of
0.05 or less is generally considered to be statistically significant and evidence of a
relationship between the two variables at issue (for example, the relationship between
geographic region and MI charging decisions found in Table 3.2(A), column 1).
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Table 3.2(A):
M1 Charging and Sentencing, Rural vs. Urban
Pros.
Pros.
Charged Withdrew
M1 Charge
M1
(NS)

Pros.
Took M1
Charge to
Trial
(NS)

Jury
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge

M1
Convict.
After M1
Charge

Total
M1
Convict.
*

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

85.5%
(262)
28.9%
(228)

50.9%
(224)
53.0%
(66)

46.4%
(224)
45.5%
(66)

39.4%
(104)
23.3%

30.8%
(224)
36.4%

26.3%
(262)
10.5%

(30)

(66)

(228)

MSA
Counties
(274 Cases)
Rural
Cunte
(282 Cases)

59.1%
(274)
58.5%
(282)

47.5%
(162)

40.7%
(162)

15.2%
(66)

46.3%
(162)

27.4%
(274)

41.8%
(165)

43.6%
(165)

31.9%
(72)

44.2%
(165)

25.9%
(282)

Total
(1046 Cases)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
County
(228 Cases)

Table 3.2(A) shows that, after separating St. Louis City and Jackson
County from other MSA counties, there are no significant differences between
rural and MSA counties. Prosecutors in rural and MSA counties charged MI at
approximately the same rate (58.5% and 59.1%, respectively) and secured M1
convictions at approximately the same rate (25.9% and 27.4%, respectively).
While it appears that prosecutors in MSA counties were more likely than their
rural counterparts to withdraw an MI charge, this result was not statistically
significant. In contrast, jurors in rural counties were twice as likely as their MSA
counterparts to reject an Ml charge proffered by a prosecutor, and this difference
is statistically significant.
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Table 3.2(B):
Ml Charging and Sentencing, Demographics of Jury Pool
Pros.
Pros.
Pros.
Charged Withdrew Took M1
M1
M1 Charge Charge
(NS)
to Trial

Jury
Convict.
of Lesser
Charge

Ml
Convict.
After M1
Charge

(NS)

**

**

Total
M1
Convict.
***

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

SL
City, 57%
nonwite
(262 Cases)

85.5%
(262)

50.9%
(224)

46.4%
(224)

39.4%
(104)

30.8%
(224)

26.3%
(262)

Jackson
County, 32%
nonwhite
(228 Cases)

28.9%
(228)

53.0%
(66)

45.5%
(66)

23.3%
(30)

36.4%
(66)

10.5%
(228)

Jury Pool,
10-30%
nonwhite
(204 Cases)

59.3%
(204)

44.6%
(121)

43.8%
(121)

17.0%
(53)

47.9%
(121)

28.4%
(204)

Jury Pool,
5-10%
nonwhite
(169 Cases)

55.0%
(169)

40.9%
(93)

44.1%
(93)

17.1%
(41)

51.6%
(93)

28.4%
(169)

Jury Pool,
0-5%
nonwhite
(183 Cases)

61.7%
(183)

47.8%
(113)

38.9%
(113)

38.6%
(44)

37.2%
(113)

23.0%
(183)

Total
(1046 Cases)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

Table 3.2(B) presents geographic results broken down by jury pool
demographics. As noted in the Table, the jury pool in St. Louis City is 57.0%
nonwhite, and the jury pool in Jackson County is 32.3% nonwhite. Thus, one could
divide the five geographic categories in Table 3.2(B) into three groups: those with
a high percentage (30% and higher) of nonwhites in the jury pool (St. Louis City

and Jackson County), those with a medium percentage (5-30%), and those with a
low percentage (0-5%). 99 Viewed in this way, it is evident that counties with a
medium percentage of nonwhites in the jury pool have the highest Ml conviction

99.
Aside from St. Louis
in the state with jury pools that are
(29.4%), Pulaski County (24.3%),
(22.7%). Of these four, St. Louis
counties.

City and Jackson County, there are only four counties
more than 20% nonwhite. They are: Pemiscot County
St. Louis County (24.0%), and Mississippi County
County is an MSA county and the others are rural
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rate, measured as a percentage of the Ml charges. 00° Counties in the 5-10% range
have an Ml conviction rate of 51.6%, and those in the 10-30% range have an MI
conviction rate of 47.9%. In contrast, counties with a low percentage of nonwhites
in the jury pool (0-5%), and those with a high percentage of nonwhites (St. Louis
City and Jackson), all have Ml conviction rates between 30-38%. Interestingly,
the high Ml conviction rate for counties with a medium nonwhite population
appears to be largely a function of jury decision-making, rather than aggressive
charging by prosecutors. The jurors in these counties were much more likely than
their counterparts in other counties to return an Ml conviction instead of
convicting the defendant of a lesser included offense. This is further bolstered by
the result that there are no statistically significant differences across geographic
regions in the prosecutor's decision to withdraw Ml charges or in the rate at which
prosecutors took MI charges to trial. The prosecutor's initial M1 charging decision
and the jury's decision to reject the Ml charge at trial are the two primary decision
points that demonstrate geographic disparities.
Table 3.2(C) shows that the higher Ml conviction rate for counties with a
moderate percentage of nonwhites in the jury pool applies separately to both rural
and MSA counties. Using a 5% cut-off to divide the rural counties into two
groups,' 0 1 Table 3.2(C) shows that rural counties with a nonwhite population in the
5-30% range have an Ml conviction rate of 51.9%. In contrast, rural counties with
a nonwhite population below 5% have an MI conviction rate of only 37.2%. For
MSA counties (other than St. Louis and Jackson), the difference is less
pronounced, but not unimportant. MSA counties with a nonwhite population in the
10-30% range have an Ml conviction rate of 50.0%, compared to a 42.5% rate for
MSA counties with a nonwhite population below 10%.102 While a smaller absolute
difference, the change represents a 15% decrease in the Ml conviction rate for
counties with a more homogeneous jury pool.

100.
If one measures the M1 conviction rate as a percentage of the total cases,
Jackson is an outlier, as noted above. Here, though, we focus on the MI conviction rate as a
percentage of the MI charges, which is the percentage in column 5.
101.
We use a 5%cut-off to divide rural counties, and a 10% cut-off to divide
MSA counties, primarily to ensure an adequate number of cases in each group. If we used a
5%cut-off for MSA counties, the total number of cases in the 0-5 category would be very
small. Similarly, if we used a 10% cut-off to divide rural counties, the total number of cases
in the 10-30 category would be quite small.
102.
This pattern of differences is highly statistically significant.
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Table 3.2(C):
M1 vs. M2, Combine Rural/Urban and Jury Pool Demographics
Pros.
Pros.
Charged Withdrew
M1
M1
Charge
(NS)

Pros.
Took M1
Charge
to Trial
(NS)

Jury
Convict. of
Lesser
Charge

M1
Convict.
After M1
Charge

Total
Ml
Convict.
*

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

85.5%

50.9%

46.4%

39.4%

30.8%

26.3%

(262)

(224)

(224)

(104)

(224)

(262)

Jackson
County, 32%
nonwhite
(228 Cases)

28.9%
(228)

53.0%
(66)

45.5%
(66)

23.3%
(30)

36.4%
(66)

10.5%
(228)

MSA,
10-30%
nonwhite
(128 Cases)

64.1%
(128)

43.9%
(82)

43.9%
(82)

13.9%
(36)

50.0%
(82)

32.0%
(128)

MSA,
0-10%
nonwhite
(146 Cases)

54.8%
(146)

51.2%
(80)

37.5%
(80)

16.7%
(30)

42.5%
(80)

23.3%
(146)

Rural,
5-30%
nonwhite
(146 Cases)

54.1%
(146)

38.0%
(79)

46.8%
(79)

21.6%
(37)

51.9%
(79)

28.1%
(146)

Rural, 0-5%
nonwhite
(136 Cases)

63.2%

45.3%

40.7%

42.9%

37.2%

23.5%

(136)

(86)

(86)

(35)

(86)

(136)

Total
(1046 Cases)

59.0%
(1046)

47.8%
(617)

44.1%
(617)

29.8%
(272)

39.1%
(617)

23.0%
(1046)

SL City, 57%
nonwhite
(262 Cases)

One possible explanation for the data is that Ml conviction rates are
highest in areas that have the greatest racial tension. It is plausible to suggest that
racial tension is low in counties where the population is virtually all white (0-5%
nonwhite), and in counties where nonwhites constitute a majority, or a substantial
minority, of the population'(St. Louis and Jackson). In contrast, racial tension may
be greatest in counties with an intermediate level of nonwhite population.' 03 While
this Article cannot answer this question directly, Section C investigates the

103.
The combined lack of interracial homicides and the small number of venue
changes (both of which are ways to try to answer this question) make testing this hypothesis
directly quite difficult.
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interaction of geography with race effects. First, however, Section B describes the
results of an analysis of race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects.
B. RacialDisparities
Traditionally, empirical investigations of racial disparities in murder
convictions have broken down disparities by race of the defendant, race of the
victim, and their interaction. This Section follows this framework. 1°4 Because the
racial identities of defendants and victims are only known in our detailed database,
we use this smaller dataset to explore the potential racial disparities in MI
outcomes. Relying on the smaller sample implies that some large absolute
differences in outcomes will not be statistically significant; that is, they may have
resulted from our random sampling rather than from the decisions made in
individual cases. Thus, these tables also indicate the statistical significance of the
differences: the top row of each table notes whether the disparities in outcomes are
statistically significant across races. 10 5 In addition, because of our sampling plan,
where we oversampled capital cases relative to other homicide cases, each cell
contains the weighted average of the appropriate case outcome. This is an unbiased
estimate of the true percentage in the comprehensive database.
Generally, the disparities in processing M1 charges based upon the
defendant's race are not statistically significant. 10 6 Focusing first on the initial
decision to charge Ml, Table 3.3(A) demonstrates that there is no evidence of a
disparate impact in Ml charging based upon the race of the defendant. Prosecutors
charge both white and black defendants with MI about 55% to 60% of the time.
Prosecutors charging other-race defendants charge M1 less often (28.1% of the
time). With a small number of other-race defendants, overall, this could be due to
chance variation in our detailed database; there is no evidence of a statistically
significant difference between the charging rates.
There is also no evidence of a race-of-defendant disparity in the MIwithdrawal rate; for white and black defendants, this happens about 40.4% and
46.5% of the time, respectively. Prosecutors withdrew Ml charges against otherrace defendants less often (18%), but, again, with only five other-race defendants
charged with M1, this difference is not statistically significant.

104.
See supra Tables 3.3(A)-3.3(C) (detailing the results).
105.
The significance level is, in some sense, a measure of the likelihood that the
observed difference in percentages was too extreme to be caused by chance. More exactly,
it is the probability that a deviation from the null hypothesis at least as large as the observed
deviation would be observed. In this case, the null hypothesis is that race is independent
from charging practices. The significance level is calculated based on a Pearson Chisquared test of independence. See ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS (2002) for
details. Pearson Chi-Squared tests are a good approximation of an exact test when the
expected number of cases within each cell is greater than five; there are some cases where
the expected number of cases is fewer than five. We mention this in the text when relevant,
and perform exact tests, which do not suffer from this problem, whenever possible.
106.

See supra Table 3.3(A).
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Table 3.3(A):
M1 vs. M2, Race of Defendant
Pros.
Charged
M1
NS

Pros.
Pros.
Withdrew Took M1
M1
Charge
Charge
to Trial

Jury
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge

M1
Total
Convict.
MI
After M1 Convict.
Charge
NS

NS

NS

+

NS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

White
Defendant
(122 Cases)

55.0%
(122)

40.4%
(98)

44.2%
(98)

43.0%
(43)

40.7%

22.3%

(98)

(122)

Black
Defendant
(16eCases)

58.3%
(116)

46.5%
(83)

47.3%
(83)

24.9%
(45)

41.7%

24.3%

(83)

(116)

Other-Race 07
Defendant

28.1%

18.0%

82.0%

(9)

(5)

(5)

78.0%
(3)

18.0%
(5)

5.1%
(9)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

(9 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

There is some evidence of racial differences in the rate at which the jury
convicts a defendant of a lesser charge in an MI trial. White defendants are almost
twice as likely as black defendants to be convicted of a lesser charge (43.0%
versus 24.9% lesser-charge conviction rates). 10 8 In the final stage, however, there
is no statistically significant race-of-defendant disparity in the proportion of Ml
convictions. Thus, throughout the homicide case decision tree, there is little
evidence that the decisions of the prosecutor or the jury10 9 create disparities
between defendants based on their race.
Table 3.3(B) provides estimates of outcome probabilities by race-ofvictim and shows that there are no statistically significant disparities based upon
race-of-victim. Prosecutors initially charged Ml about 55% of the time and
withdrew those charges about 40-50% of the time. While there is slight variation
across race-of-victim in these percentages, the differences are not statistically
significant.' 10 Finally, there is no evidence of a disparity in the rate at which cases
yielded M1 convictions, either in the subset of cases that went to trial or in all
107.
"Other-race" defendants are Hispanic or Asian. There were no individuals in
the detailed database identified as Native American, either as defendants or as victims.
108.
This finding is only marginally statistically significant.
109.
For ease of exposition, throughout this Article, we use the word "jury" to
describe the fact-finder at trial, although many trials were, in fact, bench trials decided by a
judge. We do not wish, however, to confuse the judge's decision-making role over the trial
(for example, in excluding evidence) with the judge's fact-finding role in a bench trial.
110.
Cases involving other-race victims have lower rates of Ml charges and the
withdrawal of MI charges, but with only eight such cases, the differences are not
statistically significant.
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homicide cases. Overall, there is no evidence of race-of-victim disparities in
homicide decisions regarding the MI versus M2 distinction.
Table 3.3(B):
M1 vs. M2, Race of Victim
Pros.
Pros.
Charged Withdrew
Ml
Ml
(NS)
Charge
(NS)
(1)
(2)
White
Vit
Victim(s)
(149Cases)
Black
Victim(s)
(87 Cases)

52.3%

Pros.
Jury
Ml
Total
Took M1 Convict. of Convict.
Ml
Charge to
Lesser
After
Convict.
Trial
Charge Ml Charge
(NS)
(NS)
(NS)
(NS)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(141)
59.9%

40.5%
(116)
49.1%

45.8%
(116)
45.0%

27.8%
(53)
31.4%

46.8%
(116)

24.7%
(141)

36.6%

21.9%

(82)

(64)

(64)

(34)

(64)

(82)

Other-race
victim(s)
Vc ses)

46.1%
(9)

5.5%
(6)

89.0%
(6)

87.6%
(4)

16.5%
(6)

7.6%
(9)

Total
(247 Cases)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
(247)

The single-variable results from Tables 3.3(A) and 3.3(B) may mask
interactions between variables that are significant. In particular, the single-variable
analysis cannot determine how the decision-making process differs for interracial
homicides. Table 3.3(C) presents the data broken out by both race-of-defendant
and race-of-victim in order to investigate potential racial disparities further.
Because most homicides in Missouri involve defendants and victims of the same
race, investigating the disparities based on these two variables separately masks
which variable is more important. Put another way, because of the strong
correlation between defendant's race and victim's race, a difference in the
treatment of defendants based upon their race may secondarily cause a disparity in
treatment of defendants based upon the race of their victims, and vice versa. In
addition, studies of death penalty disparities have often found that the interaction
of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim is more than the sum of its parts; that is,
that the disparate impact seen across defendants' race depends on the race of the
victim. Table 3.3(C) demonstrates that this is true to some extent in Ml
prosecution as well.
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Table 3.3(C):
M1 vs. M2, Combined Race of Defendant / Race of Victim
Pros.
Pros.
Charged Withdrew
M1
M1
(NS)
Charge
(NS)

Pros.
Took M1
Charge to
Trial
(NS)

Jury
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
+

M1
Total M1
Convict. Convict.
After
(NS)
Charge
(NS)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

White
Defendant,
White
Victim

53.7%
(115)

40.0%
(92)

43.6%
(92)

39.2%

42.9%

23.1%

(40)

(92)

(115)

(115 Cases)
White
Defendant,
Black
Victim

100%
(4)

50.0%
(4)

50%

87.6%

6.2%

6.2%

(4)

(2)

(4)

(4)

(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant,
White
Victim

52.7%
(31)

41.5%
(22)

51.4%
(22)

2.7%

57.1%

30.0%

(12)

(22)

(31)

(31 Cases)
Black
Defendant,
Black
Victim

59.4%
(84)

49.3%
(60)

44.7%

27.3%

38.5%

22.9%

(60)

(32)

(60)

(84)

(84 Cases)
Other
Combos.
(13 Cases

36.3%
(13)

9.9%
(8)

85.1%
(8)

85.5%
(5)

19.8%
(8)

7.2%
(13)

Total
(247 Cases)

55.8%
(247)

43.6%
(186)

46.8%
(186)

33.3%
(91)

40.8%
(186)

22.8%
247

Consistent with Tables 3.3(A) and (B), there is no statistically significant
disparity based on the combination of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim in the
initial charging decision, the decision to withdraw an MI charge, or the decision to
pursue a trial on MI charges. However, Table 3.3(C) demonstrates a marginally
statistically significant racial disparity in the percentage of cases in which the jury
convicts the defendant of a lesser homicide charge at trial. Juries were more lenient
with white defendants who killed white victims, convicting them of a lesser charge
39.2% of the time, compared to 27.3% of the time for black defendants who killed
black victims.
While the number of cases for interracial homicides taken to Ml trial was
quite small, these cases demonstrate a large racial disparity in conviction rates.
White defendants who killed black victims had only a 6.2% chance of being
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convicted of MI at trial, whereas black defendants who killed white victims had a
97.3% chance of being convicted of M I at trial."'1
Overall, the primary racial disparity in the homicide prosecution decision
tree appears during the trial in the jury's decision to convict on Ml or on a lesser
homicide charge. This disparity does not remain when looking at the entire process
as a whole; there is no statistically significant disparity in MI convictions by race.
The disparity is not necessarily causal; we have not investigated whether race is
the reason behind the differences in decision-making. Nevertheless, it does
implicate how the criminal justice system makes decisions and allows such
disparate impact to continue across the fault line of race.
C. InteractionEffects
To conclude the analysis of MI charging and conviction patterns in
Missouri, Table 3.4 presents logistic regressions of each decision on multiple
variables at once, rather than separating the variables to investigate individual
disparities. These regressions demonstrate, once again, that place matters. Even
after controlling for race, the primary results of Table 3.2(C) hold St. Louis City
charges Ml aggressively but then drops these charges more readily than other
counties, while Jackson County refrains from charging Ml much more frequently
than other counties. The regressions also demonstrate that race matters: black
defendants in a murder trial are much more likely to be convicted of Ml than their
white counterparts, as juries are more lenient with white defendants.
As a descriptive matter, a logistic regression of several variables at once
demonstrates which variables have larger disparities and which disparities are
more likely to be a by-product of another disparity (for example, whether the
disparity in race-of-victim is a by-product of a disparity in race-of-defendant). For
these reasons, it is important to investigate the interaction among variables.
Documenting disparities based upon individual variables, as the earlier tables do,
is equally important because it demonstrates what disparities the system creates
across these critical fault lines in our society. Homicide charges are very serious;
large disparities across counties in charging and sentencing practices are
troublesome because they inject an element of arbitrariness into a process where
the stakes are so high. 1 2 However, geographic disparities that lead to racial
disparities are, perhaps, even more worrisome, because of the historical legacy of
discrimination in the criminal justice system. The fact that one can control for
racial disparities by including geography as a variable does not negate the overall
impact of racial differences; it simply suggests that geographic differences may be
causing racial disparities.

Ill.
Table 3.3(C) lists the probability of being convicted of a lesser charge at
trial; from this number, one can compute the probability of being convicted of MI at trial.
For example, black defendants who kill white victims are convicted of a lesser charge at
trial 2.7% of the time, making their M1 conviction rate after trial 97.3% (100% - 2.7%).
112.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that because the death
penalty is the "ultimate sanction," death penalty jurisprudence requires a heightened
consideration of constitutional concerns. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
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Table 3.4:
M1 vs. M2, Interaction of Racial and Geographic Differences
Pros.
Charged
M1

Pros.
Took M1
Charge
to Trial
R'=0.09

Jury
Convicted
of Lesser
Charge
R2=0.31

M1
Convict.
After MI
Charge
R2=0.09

Total
M1
Convict.

R2=0.0911 3

Pros.
Withdrew
MI
Charge
R'=0.10

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.7
(4)

1.1

0ol14

0.3*

0.4

(4)

(4)

(2)

(4)

(4)

Black D,
WhitesV
(31 Cases)
Black D,
Black
V
(84 Cases)

1.1
(31)

1.2
(22)

1.1
(22)

0.01**
(12)

2.8
(22)

2.0
(31)

1.0
(84)

2.2+
(60)

0.6
(60)

0.08**

1.5

1.2

(32)

(60)

(84)

Other
Racial Combos.
(13 cases)
SL City
(46 Cases)
Jackson County
(39 Cases)
MSA,0-10%
nonwhite
(45 Cases)

0.5
(13)

0.2+
(8)

8.0+
(8)

2.7
(5)

0.5
(8)

0.3
(13)

2.0
(46)
0.3*
(39)
0.6
(45)

7.1*
(39)
3.5
(15)
14.6*
(34)

0.2*
(39)
0.4
(15)
0.1*

1.9
(18)
0.3
(8)
0

0.2*
(39)
0.5
(15)
0.6

0.4+
(46)
0.3*
(39)
0.4

(34)

(12)

(34)

(45)

Rural, 5-30%
nonwhite
(45 Cases)

0.9
(45)

4.4
(38)

0.2
(38)

0.3

0.7

0.7

(20)

(38)

(45)

Rural, 0-5%
nonwhite
(35wCase
(35 Cases)

1
(35)

5.1
(30)

0.2
(30)

Baseline: MSA,
10-30%
nonwhitejury
pool; White D,
White V
White D,
Bl(4
Cases)

0011

5

R2=0.06

0.02**

1.2

1.1

(13)

(30)

(35)

Table 3.4 presents logistic regressions of critical decision points. Logistic
regressions estimate the "odds ratio" of a case with the given attributes (for
example, a case from St. Louis City) compared with a baseline case. The odds
113.
The pseudo-R 2 is a measure of how much of the variation in decision-making
a model explains. A pseudo-R2 of 1 would mean that the model completely explained the
outcomes in every case. A small pseudo-R 2, around 0.10, means that the model explains
little of the variation in outcomes-that is, that other, unobserved differences in the cases
explain most of the variation.
114.
Because all cases in this category were treated the same way, the model
cannot estimate an odds ratio. As the ratio is 100% to 0%, the odds are infinite. Similarly,
for cases in which the ratio is 0% to 100%, the odds are 0, which is also indeterminate
(because logistic regressions actually estimate natural logarithm of odds ratios, and the
logarithm of zero is indeterminate).
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ratio is defined as the odds of an outcome for a case with given attributes divided
by the odds of an outcome for the baseline (or comparison) cases. For Table 3.4,
the baseline case is a case from a county in an5 MSA with a 10-30% nonwhite jury
pool, a white defendant, and a white victim."1
The results presented in Table 3.4 demonstrate that geography is the
strongest predictor of MI charging and conviction patterns; most of the
statistically significant variables are geographic. First, in the decision to charge
MI, Jackson County has odds of 0.3 to 1 compared to the baseline. Thus, the
Jackson County disparity in MI charging practice does not disappear when
controlling for race; it is also of about the same magnitude as Table 3.2(C)
suggests. Jackson County is the only factor listed in Table 3.4 that presents a
statistically significant disparity in MI charging patterns. With respect to the next
decision point, whether the prosecutor withdrew the Ml charge, the primary
disparity is between MSA counties with small minority jury pools and the baseline
(of MSA counties with larger minority jury pools). Among cases from MSA
counties with 0-10% nonwhite jury pools, the prosecutor was 14.6 times more
likely to have withdrawn the Ml charge than the baseline case. In addition, cases
from St. Louis City and cases with black defendants and black victims are more
likely to be those in which the prosecutor withdrew the initial MI charge. In St.
Louis City, the odds are seven times greater than the baseline; for black defendants
who kill black victims, the odds are 2.2 times as large as the baseline.
The final two columns of Table 3.4 present the odds ratios for Ml
convictions. Geographic disparities, once again, are more significant than racial
disparities. With respect to the odds of an M1 conviction after an initial M1
charge, cases from St. Louis City had an odds ratio five times smaller than the
baseline. This exacerbates the disparity between St. Louis City and other counties
that exists without controlling for race: different distributions of racial groups hide
a larger geographic disparity for St. Louis City, where the odds of an M1
conviction are 2.5 times smaller than the baseline odds. This contrasts with
115.
Thus, the odds ratio of 2.0 for St. Louis City in M I charging means that the
odds were two times higher that a white defendant with a white victim from St. Louis City
was charged with Ml as compared to the odds that a white defendant with a white victim
from a county in an MSA with 10-30% minority jury pool was charged with MI. Similarly,
with an odds ratio of 1.0, the odds that a black defendant who killed a black victim was
charged with Ml are the same as the odds that a white defendant who killed a white victim
was charged with Ml. In general, the closer the odds ratio is to one, the smaller the disparity
in outcomes between the baseline and the variable at issue. One final note: in order to
estimate accurately, logistic regression must have some variation in outcomes. If all cases of
one type have the same outcome, logistic regression estimates that all potential cases of the
same type would have that outcome-i.e., that one could predict perfectly what would
happen in these cases. Thus, the logistic regression for the MI charging decision cannot
estimate the odds ratio of white defendants with black victims, because that value is infinite.
In situations with a small number of cases (such as here, with only four such cases), one
cannot rely on this estimate; it simply means that out of the four cases which had white
defendants with black victims, all four defendants were charged with MI. It does not
determine whether that fact is statistically significant. Operationally, these four cases are
dropped from the analysis, because they provide no information to help estimate other
parameters, and because the model cannot estimate an infinite odds ratio.
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Jackson County, where controlling for race does not change the geographic pattern
much, remaining at 3.3 times smaller than the odds for the baseline case. While the
odds ratio for cases with white defendants who kill black victims is also
statistically significant, with only four cases of this type, the result is not terribly
robust. Overall, disparities across different counties are significant and enduring.
St. Louis City and Jackson County have significantly different charging and
conviction patterns than other counties, even after controlling for race. With
respect to racial disparities, there are large disparities in the rate at which judges
and juries convict defendants of MI, rather than a lesser homicide charge.
Focusing on race alone, when prosecutors take Ml charges to trial, they are more
likely to secure M I convictions for black defendants than for white defendants.
IV. LIFE VERSUS DEATH
The Missouri homicide statute gives prosecutors extremely broad
discretion to make charging decisions that largely determine which defendants
should be sentenced to death and which defendants should receive less harsh
sentences. 11 6 This broad discretion raises questions about whether the exercise of
discretion differs across regions or racial lines. Figure 4.1 depicts the process that
produces decisions about which defendants live and which ones are sentenced to
death. This Part examines racial and geographic disparities at different points in
this decision-making process, focusing on the four decision points identified in
Figure 4.1. Section A examines geographic disparities and Section B analyzes
racial disparities. Section C presents the results of a regression analysis that
examines the interactions among these two sets of variables. In brief, the analysis
demonstrates that the discretionary choices that prosecutors make in capital
prosecutions allow for significant disparities in the manner in which defendants of
different races and from different regions are prosecuted.

116.

See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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Figure 4.1
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Following the convention in Part III, the data tables throughout Part IV
have column headings identical to the headings in Table 4.1 below. The headings
of Columns 1-4 correspond to the points labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 4.v The
percentages for the comprehensive database in the top row of Table 4.1 are
unweighted. The percentages for the detailed database in the bottom row are based
on weighted averages. The number in parentheses in each cell is the unweighted
denominator; that is, the number of cases that the percentage in that cell is based
upon. The percentages in Columns 1-3 are calculated on the frequencyeprevious
node in the decision tree. Thus, the percentage in the top row of Column o means
that prosecutors filed a capital charge in 12.7% of all intentional-homicide cases.

Similarly, the percentage in the top row of Column 2 means that prosecutors
pursued a capital trial in 39.8% of the cases that were charged as capital cases.
Columns 4 and 5 display two different measurements for the frequency of death
sentences. The denominator for the percentage in Column 4 is the number of cases
in which the prosecutor took a capital charge to trial. The denominator for the

percentage in Column 5 is the universe of all intentional-homicide cases. We
utilize the same format for all the remaining tables in Part V to analyze geographic
and racial disparities.
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Table 4.1

Comprehensive
database
(1046 Cases)
Detailed
Databae

247 Cases

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge
at Trial

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Trial

Total
Death
Sentences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

12.7%

39.8%

50.9%

49.1%

2.5%

(1046)

(133)

(53)

(53)

(1046)

13.0%
(247)

39.4%
(127)

48.0%
(50)

52.0%
(50)

2.7%
(247)

A. Geographic Disparity

Investigating the geographic disparities in capital prosecution, the study
finds significant disparities in capital prosecution across regions. If one compares
St. Louis City and Jackson County to the rest of the state, it appears that their very
low capital conviction rates can be attributed primarily to low initial capital
charging rates. In contrast, if one leaves aside St. Louis City and Jackson County
and compares the remaining groups of counties to each other, the differences in
sentencing outcomes have more to do with downstream prosecutorial decisions
and jury behavior, rather than the initial decision to charge a case as capital or
noncapital. Tables 4.2(A) to 4.2(C) provide more specific details regarding the
regional disparities in capital prosecution. These tables follow the same rubric as
in Part III.A above.
Several aspects of the data in Table 4.2(A) are noteworthy. First,
prosecutors in St. Louis City and Jackson County filed capital charges much less
frequently than prosecutors in the rest of the state. In St. Louis City, prosecutors
charged capital in 6.5% of the intentional-homicide cases; in Jackson, the
comparable figure was 1.3%. But in the rest of the state, prosecutors charged
capital in roughly 20% of the intentional-homicide cases. This pattern of
differences is highly statistically significant. On a related point, prosecutors in St.
Louis City and Jackson County also obtained capital convictions far less
frequently than their counterparts in the rest of the state. St. Louis prosecutors
obtained capital convictions in fewer than one-half of 1% of intentional-homicide
cases. Jackson prosecutors produced no capital convictions in more than 200 cases.
In contrast, prosecutors in the rest of Missouri obtained capital convictions in
about 4.5% of all intentional-homicide cases. This pattern is highly statistically
significant.
If one sets aside St. Louis City and Jackson County, and focuses on the
rest of the state, other points illustrate the complex interplay between race and
geography in capital prosecutions. While Table 4.2(A) shows that rural counties
and MSA counties have fairly similar capital charging and sentencing rates, Table
4.2(B) shows that there is greater variability across groups of counties if one
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utilizes the racial composition of the jury pool to divide counties into groups.
Defendants in counties where the jury pool is 10-30% nonwhite were more than
twice as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants in counties where the jury
pool is just 5-10% nonwhite. This difference does not correlate with differences in
capital charging rates between the two groups: indeed, the charging rate in the
5-10% group was slightly higher. Rather, the difference in sentencing outcomes is
primarily attributable to the fact that juries in the 5-10% counties were twice as
likely to reject capital charges at trial as juries in the 10-30% counties.
Table 4.2(A):
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Rural vs. Urban

17

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial
(NS)

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge
at Trial

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Death
Total
Sentences
Death
After
Sentences
Capital
Trial

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
County
(228 Cases)
MSA
C s
(274 Cases)

6.5%
(262)
1.3%

47.1%
(17)
66.7%

87.5%
(8)
100.0%

12.5%
(8)
0

0.4%
(262)
0

(228)
17.9%
(274)

(3)
36.7%
(49)

(2)

(2)

(228)

44.4%
(18)

55.6%
(18)

3.6%
(274)

Rural
Cute
(282 Cases)

22.7%
(282)

39.1%
(64)

40.0%
(25)

60.0%
(25)

5.3%
(282)

Total
(1046 Cases)

12.7%
(1046

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)

117.
The statistical test used for columns 2-4 in Tables 4.2(A)-(C) was Fisher's
Exact test, which does not rely on large samples, but instead provides an exact estimate of
the p-value. Throughout this Article, Fisher's Exact test was used whenever possible
(because of some small cell counts). Because of the sampling scheme, however, the more
general Pearson Chi-Squared Test was used for much of the detailed database testing,
specifically when both capital charges and noncapital cases are being compared.
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Table 4.2(B):
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Demographics of Jury Pool

SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
County
(228 Cases)
Jury Pool
10-30%
nonwhite
(204 Cases)
Jury Pool
5-10%
nonwhite
(169 Cases)
Jury Pool
0-5%
nonwhite
(183 Cases)
Total
(1046 Cases)

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge
at Trial

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Trial

Total
Death
Sentences

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial
(NS)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

6.5%
(262)
1.3%
(228)

47.1%
(17)
66.7%
(3)

87.5%
(8)
100.0%

12.5%
(8)
0

0.4%
(262)
0

(2)

(2)

(228)

19.1%
(204)

48.7%
(39)

31.6%
(19)

68.4%
(19)

6.4%
(204)

21.3%
(169)

38.9%
(36)

64.3%
(14)

35.7%
(14)

3.0%
(169)

20.8%
(183)

26.3%
(38)

30%
(10)

70.0%
(10)

3.8%
(183)

12.7%
(1046)

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)
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Table 4.2(C):
Capital Charging and Death Sentences,
Combine Rural/Urban and Jury Pool Demographics
Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial
(NS)

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge
at Trial

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Trial

Total
Death
Sentences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

SL City
(262 Cases)

6.5%
(262)

47.1%
(17)

87.5%
(8)

(12.5%)
(8/262)

0.4%
(262)

Jackson
County
(228 Cases)
MSA,
Jury Pool
10-30%
nonwhite

1.3%

66.7%

100.0%

0

0

(228)

(3)

(2)

(2)

(228)

16.4%
(128)

52.4%
(21)

27.3%

72.7%

6.2%

(11)

(11)

(128)

(128 Cases)
MSA,
Juy Pool
0-10%
nonwhite

19.2%
(146)

25.0%

71.4%

28.6%

1.4%

(28)

(7)

(7)

(146)

24.0%
(146)

45.7%

43.7%

56.2%

6.2%

(35)

(16)

(16)

(146)

21.3%
(136)

31.0%

33.3%

66.7%

4.4%

(29)

(9)

(9)

(136)

12.7%
(1046)

39.8%
(133)

50.9%
(53)

49.1%
(53)

2.5%
(1046)

(146 Cases)

Rural,
Jury Pool
5-30%
nonwhite
(146 Cases)

Rural,
Jury Pool
0-5%
nonwhite
(136 Cases)

Total
(1046 Cases)

Table 4.2(C) demonstrates that there is significant variability in death
penalty prosecution across groups of counties other than Jackson and St. Louis
City. The initial capital charging rates, while ranging only from a low of 16.4%
(MSA, 10-30%) to a high of 24.0% (rural, 5-30%), demonstrate a statistically
significant relationship between geographic region and capital charging. In
contrast, while there is much more variability in the rate at which prosecutors took
capital charges to trial (Column 2), this pattern is not statistically significant, and
there is no evidence to suggest that the variability across geographic regions is
systematic. The differences in the rates at which juries rejected capital charges at
trial (Column 3), however, are also statistically significant. Excluding Jackson
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County and St. Louis City, these range from a high of 71.4% (MSA 0-10%) to just
27.3% (MSA 10-30%). Overall, MSA counties with a jury pool that is 0-10%
nonwhite had the lowest capital trial rate (25.0%) and the highest jury-rejection
rate (71.4%), which resulted in the lowest capital-conviction rate (1.4%). In
contrast, MSA counties with a jury pool that is 10-30% nonwhite had the highest
capital-trial rate (52.4%) and the lowest jury-rejection rate (27.3%), resulting in a
6.2% capital-conviction rate. This final pattern in death sentences conclusively
demonstrates prosecutors and jurors from different groups of counties are making
different decisions.
B. Racial Disparity
The analysis of racial disparities demonstrates significant differences at
each decision point between cases with black versus white defendants and between
cases with black versus white victims. Tables 4.3(A) through 4.3(C) present
detailed results of the racial disparities associated with the process of deciding
which defendants are sentenced to death. Table 4.3(A) focuses on the defendant's
race as a fault line for disparities. Several noteworthy facts emerge from the
results. First, all four decision points exhibit statistically significant disparities
when comparing black versus white defendants; although adding other-race
defendants decreases the power of the test sufficiently that overall, the differences
across all races are not necessarily statistically significant. With 7.7% of black
defendants facing a capital charge, they are about a third as likely to do so as white
defendants, 21.2% of whom face a capital charge at some point during the
prosecution. The rates at which prosecutors took capital charges to trial also vary
significantly in the opposite direction: white defendants are two-thirds as likely to
face a capital trial after capital charges are filed than black defendants. Thus, many
more white defendants face death penalty charges, but charges for these white
defendants are more likely to be dropped. The result between these two opposing
effects is not a wash; instead, there is a statistically significant difference of 6.6%
capital trial rate for white defendants versus 4.1% capital trial rate for black
defendants. Exacerbating the impact of this disparity on death sentences is the fact
that juries rejected capital charges more often for black defendants (52.2% versus
40%). Overall, because of the higher original filing rate and the slightly higher jury
sentencing rate, white defendants are twice as likely to be sentenced to death as
black defendants.
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Table 4.3(A):
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Race of Defendant
Prosecutor

Prosecutor

Jury

Death

Total

Filed

Pursued

Rejected

Sentences

Death

Capital
Charge

Capital
Trial

Capital
Charge

Sentences
NSt

*

After
Capital Trial
NSt

(4)

(5)

(1)

(2)

at Trial
NSt
(3)

21.2%

31.2%

40.0%

60.0%

4.0%

(122)

(80)

(25)

(25)

(122)

7.7%
(116)

53.5%
(43)

52.2%
(23)

47.8%
(23)

2.0%
(116)

Other-race
Defendant
(9 Cases)

10.1%

50.0%

100%

0%

0

(9)

(4)

(2)

(2)

(9)

Total
(247 Cases)

13.0%
(247)

39.4%
(127)

48%
(50)

52%
(50)

White
Defendant
(122 Cases)
Black
Deant
(De6Cases)

2.7%
(247)

t
Note that while the overall racial pattern is not statistically significant--or only
marginally so---the difference between white victims and black victims is highly
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001); the inclusion of other-race defendants
significantly lowers the power of the test.
Table 4.3(B) presents the data for the capital charging process broken out
by the race of the victim. The race-of-victim analysis is similar to the race-ofdefendant analysis, demonstrating significant differences in initial capital charging
rates and smaller differences in the prosecution after this point. Prosecutors are
less than half as likely to file a capital charge in cases that involve black victims
(7.0% of the time) compared to cases that involve white victims (18.5% of the
time). As with the race-of-defendant analysis, prosecutors are less likely to pursue
a capital trial initially in cases with white victims, but jurors are more likely to
sentence the defendant to death in these cases. These two effects counter-balance
each other, leaving the relative percentage of death sentences about the same as the
relative percentage of capital charges: just over two to one, with cases involving
white victims imposing a death sentence 4.0% of the time, while cases involving
black victims have a death sentence imposed 1.4% of the time.
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Table 4.3(B);
Capital Charging and Death Sentences, Race of Victim(s)

White
Victim(s)
(149 Cases)
Black
Blc
(89
Cases),
(89cas)
Other-race
Victim(s)
(9 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial
NSt

(1)

(2)

18.5%
(149)

34.7%
(92)

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge at
Trial
+
(3)

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Trial
+t
(4)

Total
Death
Sentences
+t

37.5%
(32)

62.5%
(32)

4.0%
(149)

(5)

______

7.0%

51.6%

62.5%

37.5%

1.4%

(89)
10.1%
(9)

(31)
50.0%
(4)

(16)
100%
(2)

(16)
0%
(2)

(89)

13.0%
(247)

39.4%
(127)

48%
(50)

52%
(50)

2.7%
(247)

0
(9)

Race-of-defendant and race-of-victim disparities are generally strongly
correlated because most homicides are intra-racial. Missouri is no exception, with
over 80% of homicides involving defendants and victims of the same race. Table
4.3(C) presents the interaction of these two variables. Here, almost all of the
decision points demonstrate statistically significant disparities. First, with respect
to the prosecutor's decision to file a capital charge, white defendants who kill
white victims have the highest chance of facing a capital charge (21.6%). The risk
of facing a capital charge is only about 60% as high if the victim of a white
defendant is black. Black defendants have an even lower risk. Following the
pattern for white defendants, the risk of a capital charge is almost 50% higher for
black defendants who killed white victims.
Variations in the rates at which prosecutors decided to pursue a capital
trial are not statistically significant. However, the rate at which juries imposed
death sentences at trial demonstrates significant racial disparities. If one disregards
the single case where a white defendant faced a capital trial after killing a black
victim, it is clear that black defendants who kill white victims are treated the most
harshly, with a 75% chance of a death sentence after capital trial. This is more than
twice as large as the 33.3%.chance of a death sentence for black defendants with
black victims. White defendants face a 60.9% chance of a death sentence after the
capital trial if the victim was white. Overall, death sentence rates increase by a
factor of five between the lowest probability of receiving a death sentence (1.2%
for black defendants with black victims) and the highest probability (6.2% for
white defendants with black victims). Interestingly, cross-race cases are treated
more harshly than intra-race cases; defendants in cross-race cases receive death
sentences in 4.9% of the cases, while defendants in intra-race cases receive a death
sentence in only 2.8% of the cases. This result is only marginally significant,
perhaps because of the small number of cross-race cases (thirty-five total).
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Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether this finding would persist with a
larger number of cross-race cases.
Table 4.3(C):
Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Race of Defendant and Race of Victim Combined

White
Defendant,
White Victim
(115 Cases)
White
Defendant,
Black Victim

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial
NS

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge at
Trial

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Trial

Total
Death
Sentences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

21.6%
(115)

30.3%
(76)

39.1%
(23)

60.9%
(23)

4.0%
(115)

12.4%
(4)

50%
(2)

0%
(1)

100%
(1)

6.2%
(4)

10.4%
(31)

57.1%
(14)

25.0%
(8)

75.0%
(8)

4.5%
(31)

6.9%
(84)

51.7%
(29)

66.7%
(15)

33.3%
(15)

1.2%
(84)

10.8%
(13)
(13)
13.0%
247

50%
(6)
(6)
39.4%
(127)

100%
(3)
(3
48%
(50)

0%
(3)

0%
(13)

52%
(50)

2.7%
(247)

*

(4 Cases)

Black
Defendant,
White Victim
(31 Cases)
Black
Defendant,
Black Victim
(84 Cases)
Other
Combinations
(13 Cases)
Total
(247 Cases)

The most robust racial difference in capital charging is the difference
across racial lines in intra-race cases. Homicides with white defendants and white
victims are treated significantly more harshly than homicides with black
defendants and black victims. This may be the product of geography-prosecutors
in areas with large black populations are less likely to seek the death penalty, and
juries from these locations are less likely to impose the death penalty." 8 The next
118.
We take no specific position on causality in this study; that is, we do not
directly test whether geographic differences in charging patterns create the racial disparities
found, or whether racial bias in decision-making is the cause of the disparities. It is
important to note, however, that there are rural areas of Missouri that have a high
percentage of black residents; the racial disparities are not simply a difference between
urban and rural areas. In addition, there are myriad reasons why different prosecutors make
different decisions: they may have different case loads, types of homicide cases, and
budgetary pressures that can affect decisions. The underlying point, however, is that the
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Section turns to this question, investigating the interplay between race and
geography.
C. InteractionsBetween Variables
Geography provides a more robust explanation for the disparities in
capital prosecution than race does; all of the racial disparities are statistically
insignificant when controlling for geography. In addition, aside from the important
exception of Jackson County, the results suggest that differences in jury decisionmaking explain a significant portion of the final geographic disparities in death
sentencing rates. Table 4.4 presents the results of several logistic regressions, with
the dependent variable of each regression being a decision point in Figure 4.1, and
the independent variables being geography (as measured by both MSA and jury
pool) and race (including both race-of-defendant and race-of-victim). As with
Table 3.4, the values presented in Table 4.4 are the odds ratio of the variable listed,
as compared with the baseline.
Despite the fact that geography is a stronger explanation than race in
death penalty prosecution, cases involving white defendants with black victims,
which were a small percentage of the sample, produced results inconsistent with
this supremacy. In all of those cases, the defendants who went to trial received a
death sentence. However, there were only four such cases in the sample, and only
one that went to trial, so there is no statistically significant evidence of a disparity
between these cases and others. Similarly, no cases received a death sentence if
either the defendant or the victim was other-race, although this result is not
statistically significant because so few cases involved those facts.

decisions made, for whatever reasons, affected black defendants differently than white
defendants, and families of white victims differently than families of black victims.
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Table 4.4:
Capital Charging and Death Sentences
Interaction Between Geography and Race

Baseline: MSA
with 10-30%
nonwhite jury
pool; White
Defendant,
White Victim
White
Defendant,
Black Victim
(4 Cases)
Black
Defendant,
White Victim

Prosecutor
Filed
Capital
Charge

Prosecutor
Pursued
Capital
Trial

Death
Sentences
After
Capital
Charge
R2=0.28
(4)

Total
Death
Sentences

R'=0.05
(2)

Jury
Rejected
Capital
Charge at
Trial
R2=0.28
(3)

R 2=0.13
(1)

1

1

1

1

1

1.5

2.7

0119

0120

17.4

0.9

2.7

0.8

1.2

3.7

0.6

2.2

4.6

0.2

0.6

0.5

2.6

01 20

0120

0120

0.5

0.7

28.5*

0.04*

0.04*

0.06***

2.7

0120

0120

0120

0.9

0.4

28.4+

0.04+

0.1*

2.0

0.7

1.1

0.9

1.3

1.4

0.9

2.4

0.4

0.8

R2=0.14
(5)

(27 Cases)

Black
Defendant,
Black Victim
(76 Cases)
Other Racial

Combos.
(13 Cases)
SL City
(262 Cases)
Jackson
County
(228 Cases)
MSA, 0-10%
nonwhite
(146 Cases)
Rural, 5-30%
nonwhite
(146 Cases)

Rural, 0-5%
nonwhite
(136 Cases)

119.

See supra note 115.
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All of the statistically significant disparities are based upon geography:
independent county prosecutors make systematically different decisions. The
decision-making in Jackson County and St. Louis City creates disparities in both
outcomes and process. The odds that a defendant in Jackson County faces a capital
charge are sixteen times less (0.06 times more) than the odds for a baseline case.
No death sentences were imposed in Jackson County during the period of the
study. Prosecutors in St. Louis City are slightly less likely to file capital charges
and pursue capital trials than prosecutors in the baseline case. However, juries
reject capital charges in St. Louis City at very high rates, after controlling for race.
A defendant from St. Louis City facing a capital trial has odds 28.5 times higher
than the baseline of receiving a sentence less than death at trial. Overall, this
translates into a much smaller risk of a death sentence in St. Louis City-the odds
of receiving a death sentence (out of all intentional homicides) are twenty-five
times smaller than the odds of receiving a death sentence in a baseline county.
Cases from MSA counties with small minority jury pools (0-10%) also
demonstrate this pattern: charging and trial practices are similar to other counties,
but juries reject capital charges at a rate 28.4 times greater than the baseline rate.
This is consistent with the findings in Table 4.2(C), which suggests that MSA
counties with small minority jury pools, or very large minority jury pools (Jackson
and St. Louis City) impose death sentences less frequently than other counties in
Missouri.
In summary, geographic disparities endure after controlling for race-ofdefendant and race-of-victim, while race effects are no longer present, meaning
that geography is a more robust explanation of the capital decision-making process
than race. Except for the charging decisions of Jackson County, the results suggest
that differences in jury decision-making, rather than prosecutorial decisionmaking, explain a significant portion of the final geographic disparities in death
sentencing rates. Even more than with the analysis of Ml charging patterns,
geographic disparities are troubling. Here, the difference in sentence is literally life
or death. Significant arbitrariness in charging and sentencing is unacceptable,
particularly where the difference is, often, just a couple of miles. Absent other
significant concerns, 120 such small differences should not determine such an
important decision as that between life and death. Our analysis demonstrates that
the large racial disparities found in Part IV.B are a product in significant measure
of the geographic disparities. Curtailing the vast discretion that prosecutors have in
charging and plea-bargaining decisions may limit this geographic arbitrariness. In
doing so, it would also likely reduce the racial disparity in charging and sentencing
outcomes, as these disparities come from the disparate geographic decisionmaking. In Part V, we outline several policy issues that arise from this study, and
provide some potential decisions that the Missouri legislature could make to
narrow prosecutorial discretion.

120.
The primary concern that may trump the geographic concern is federalism,
when investigating inter-state disparities. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 354 2009

2009]

PLACE MATTERS (MOST)

355

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Over the past few decades, numerous countries throughout the world have
abolished capital punishment. Despite this global trend, there is broad public
support for continued use of capital punishment in the United States.' 21 In light of
that public support, we assume that Missouri, like other states in the United States,
will retain the death penalty as the ultimate criminal sanction for the foreseeable
future.1 22 However, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the Eighth Amendment
requires that "capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit
'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability
23
makes them 'the most deserving of execution.""1
The preceding analysis finds significant and enduring geographic
variation in the prosecution of homicides and imposition of the death penalty in
Missouri. This geographic variation combines with racial patterns in housing to
create a disparate impact on the basis of race as well. Thus, black defendants who
kill black victims are less likely to receive the death penalty than either black or
white defendants who kill white victims. Such disparate impacts on different
communities create a serious issue regarding whether the death penalty is
perceived as fair and highlight the policy choices that allow this geographic and
racial disparity to remain.
Our study demonstrates that the primary underlying policy issue is the
breadth of prosecutorial discretion. 124 Prosecutors in Missouri prosecuted about
800 death-eligible homicides between January 1997 and December 2001. Only
about fifty of those cases led to capital trials. The current statute does not provide
sufficient criteria to guide prosecutors in selecting the fifty capital trials from the
800 death-eligible cases. Without clear statutory criteria to guide them, prosecutors
in different counties may exercise their discretion in very different ways. In
Jackson County, prosecutors held capital trials in fewer than one-half of 1% of the
intentional-homicide cases they prosecuted, while in Boone, Jasper, and Pemiscot
counties, prosecutors took capital charges to trial in more than 15% of their cases.
The differences in the crimes committed in Jackson County versus Boone County
may have warranted treating the defendants in these cases differently. Conversely,
the crimes may have been similar enough that the different treatment is a
geographic lottery of sorts. Our study does not investigate the causal link between
geography and differences in homicide prosecution. But the disparities themselves

121.

Over two-thirds of Americans support the death penalty. See Lydia Saad,

Americans Hold Firm to Support for Death Penalty, GALLUP, Nov. 18, 2008,

http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 1193 1/Americans-Hold-Firm-Support-Death-Penalty.aspx;
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Nat'l Polls and Studies, Harris Interactive Poll, 3/08, availableat
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=21 6 3#308poll.
122.
New Jersey recently became the first state to abolish the death penalty in
over fifty years.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
123.
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
There is evidence that the jury also exacerbates the disparities in sentencing
124.
outcomes in capital cases. See supra Part IV.B. But very few cases reach the jury. See infra
Figure 2.2.
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suggest that the legislature is implicitly making policy choices regarding the
appropriate degree and type of variation in prosecution across different regions.
Specifically, the legislature is implicitly voicing its acceptance of large differences
in prosecution decisions across counties. More troubling, the legislature is
implicitly accepting the racial variation in prosecution that is a corollary to this
regional variation. This Section explores these policy implications further,
providing some suggested legislative changes.
The following policy decisions are designed primarily to reduce
disparities across counties in the implementation of capital punishment by limiting
the class of death-eligible offenses. Our expectation is 25
that racial disparities would
also be reduced by narrowing prosecutorial discretion.
1. Moratorium and FurtherStudy
This study raises questions about whether capital punishment in Missouri
is implemented fairly, and the present study has exposed issues that are sufficiently
serious to warrant a legislatively imposed moratorium while a further study is
being conducted. This study focuses on several decision points in which the vast
discretion the legislature provides prosecutors allows significant racial and
geographic disparities in homicide prosecution. Given the limitations we faced in
collecting and analyzing data about the implementation of capital punishment in
Missouri, 126 we recognize that the Missouri legislature may be hesitant to adopt
statutory reforms without first commissioning a state-sponsored study to obtain
more comprehensive data and perform a causal analysis. We support the idea that
there should be a state-sponsored study of capital punishment in Missouri. A more
comprehensive study could provide more detail about the specific effects of certain
policies and link those details to specific reforms.
2. Introduce a DistrictAttorney System in Missouri
In order to reduce the geographic inconsistency in death penalty
prosecution, the Missouri legislature could adopt a district attorney system in
which the state would be divided into forty-five prosecutorial districts with the
same boundaries as the forty-five judicial districts. Currently, Missouri is divided
into 115 counties, each with its own chief prosecutor. This creates 115 independent
decision-makers in Missouri, each of whom is free to follow her own conscience
on the issue of capital punishment. This is a relatively large number compared to
states that impose the death penalty with relative frequency. 27 Other things being

125.
It is possible that the crimes that different racial groups commit will still be
treated differently because of differences in the underlying conduct. In the extreme, if the
statute covered conduct that was significantly more prevalent in some communities, this
may force a reexamination of what defines the most morally culpable behavior.
126.
See infra Appendix II.
127.
Two of the other leading death penalty states have a larger number of
independent decision-makers: Texas has 155 and Virginia has 120. However, most of the
other leading death penalty states have fewer independent prosecutors. There are eightyeight in Ohio, sixty-seven in Pennsylvania, fifty-eight in California (the most populous
state), forty-eight in Georgia, forty-one in Alabama, thirty-nine in North Carolina, twentyHeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 356 2009
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equal, a larger number of independent decision-makers increases the risk of
geographic disparities across prosecutorial districts. Although Missouri has 115
counties, Missouri's judicial system is divided into forty-five judicial districts,
most of which encompass two or more counties.128 One way to curtail geographic
variation would therefore be to lower the number of regions that have separate
decision-making power.
3. Amend the Statutory Definition of Deliberation
Revision of the statutory definition of "deliberation" to require evidence
of advance planning or a preconceived design before the killing occurs would
significantly reduce prosecutorial discretion regarding capital punishment. At
present, Missouri defines the term "deliberation" to mean "cool reflection for any
length of time no matter how brief.' 129 Under this definition, there is no
meaningful distinction between MI, which is death-eligible, and "knowing" M2,
which is not death-eligible. 30 This study suggests that the lack of a clear dividing
line between MI and M2 contributes significantly to the geographic variation in
homicide charging and outcomes. The Missouri legislature may want to revisit its
homicide definitions in light of this new information. We estimate that at least
84% of all cases in the comprehensive database are Ml-eligible under the current
statute. In contrast, we estimate that only 36% of those cases would be MI-eligible
under our revised definition of "deliberation."''
4. ProportionalityReview
For every case that results in a death verdict, state law requires the
Missouri Supreme Court to consider "whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.' 3 2 In practice, the Court
conducts this proportionality review by comparing death cases to other death
cases. 33 This study explicitly compares capital and noncapital cases, and suggests
by example that this type of comparison would be a more meaningful way for the
Court to conduct a proportionality review. The Missouri Supreme Court could
modify its practice in this regard, or the legislature could amend the statute to

seven in Oklahoma and only twenty in Florida (the fourth most populous state). PERRY,
supra note 20, at 11.
128.
Political factors are the impetus behind choosing this particular number of
districts. Division into forty-five districts allows the large cities to manage their own case
loads independently, while providing savings across less populous counties. A more
significant change would be to centralize the decision-making process for capital cases by
introducing a state-wide committee to review charging decisions. This would be similar to
the federal system for death penalty prosecution, which requires the Attorney General to
approve the decision to seek the death penalty in all federal homicide cases. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYsTEM: A STATISTICAL SURvEY

23 (2000).
129.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.002(3) (2008).

130.
131.
132.
133.

See infra Appendix I.
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
§ 565.035.3(3).
See infra Appendix I.
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require comparison of death cases to nondeath cases. This would allow a more
comprehensive review of death-eligible cases.
The remaining policy decisions specifically focus on the broad statutory
aggravators for capital charges. Due to the sheer number of aggravators, and the
breadth of certain aggravators, this study demonstrates that one or more statutory4
aggravating factors are present in approximately 90% of all Mi-eligible cases. 3
Modifying the number and breadth of these statutory aggravating factors would
reduce discretion in capital-punishment cases. The statutory definition of
aggravating factors implicates basic values, expressed through the legislature's
decision to include (or exclude) certain homicides from the category of deatheligible offenses. The broad language of these aggravators leaves the important
discussion of what crimes should be death-eligible to prosecutors, with the
potential for quite different answers across jurisdictions. These inter-jurisdictional
differences, in turn, allow for significant variation in death penalty charging and
sentencing across Missouri. The suggestions below would limit the variation in
death penalty charging and sentencing specifically. Even the process of debating
these changes would return the discussion of what homicides deserve the death
penalty to the legislative branch.
5. Eliminateor Limit the "Wantonly Vile" Aggravator
The Missouri legislature could either eliminate "wantonly vile" as an
aggravator, or limit its application to cases that involve torture. This aggravator is
present in more than 90% of the Mi-eligible cases, and therefore may not satisfy
the Zant v. Stephens requirement that aggravators must genuinely narrow the class
of death-eligible offenses. If the Missouri legislature did not wish to entirely
eliminate this aggravator, it could adopt the federal definition of "torture," which is
codified in 3518 U.S.C. § 2340 as a precondition for the application of this
aggravator.1
6. Limit the Scope of the "Felony Murder" Aggravator
The Missouri legislature could narrow the scope of the "felony murder"
aggravator to apply only to rape-murder cases. In contrast, as currently drafted,
this aggravator is present in more than 50% of the Ml-eligible cases because it
covers all murders committed in conjunction with a robbery, burglary, or drug
crime. A slightly broader version would cover murders committed in conjunction
with kidnapping and/or sodomy.
7. Limit the Scope of the "ForMoney" Aggravator
The legislature could narrow the scope of the "for money" aggravator so
that it applies only to murder-for-hire cases; it would therefore apply both to the
person who pays and to the person who receives money for the commission of a
134.

See supra Tables 2.1, 2.2. *

135.
Under the federal definition, an act does not qualify as "torture" unless it is
"committed by a person acting under the color of law." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). In the
context of murder prosecutions, this requirement is illogical. Thus, the change would adopt
the federal definition without the "color of law" requirement.
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murder. The breadth of this aggravator as currently drafted is primarily attributable
to the fact that it covers all murders committed in conjunction with a theft offense,
and therefore applies in about 45% of the Ml-eligible cases. A slightly broader
version would include cases where the defendant kills a relative to obtain an
inheritance or insurance benefits.
8. Limit the Scope of the "Killing Witness" Aggravator
The legislature could narrow the scope of the "killing witness" aggravator
so that it applies only in cases where the victim was a subpoenaed or potential
witness in a criminal case where charges had already been filed. The breadth of
this aggravator stems from the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation that the
statute applies whenever "the murdered individual was a witness or potential
witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending prosecution." Thus,
the current interpretation of this aggravator allows essentially all murders
occurring with another crime to be charged, because the victims of the
nonhomicide crime were witnesses to this secondary crime. As currently
interpreted, this aggravator is present in about 48% of the MI-eligible cases.
9. Eliminate the "Avoiding Arrest" Aggravator
The Missouri legislature could eliminate the "avoiding arrest" aggravator.
Because there is virtually a complete overlap between the cases covered by this
aggravator and the cases covered by the "killing witness" aggravator, there would
be no need to retain this as a separate aggravator. 136 Moreover, the cases of
greatest concern could be covered by two more specific aggravators: the "escaped
custody" or "concealing drug crime" aggravators. As currently drafted, this
aggravator is quite broad, applying in about 48% of the Mi-eligible cases.
10. Eliminate the "Agent or Employee" Aggravator
The Missouri legislature could eliminate the "agent or employee"
aggravator. The cases of greatest concern covered by this aggravator are the
murder-for-hire cases, which are also covered by the "for money" aggravator. This
aggravator also applies to other cases that involve concerted action among two or
more co-defendants; but if the legislature found that the fact of concerted action,
without more, did not justify imposition of capital punishment, this aggravator
would be unnecessary. This broad aggravator is currently present in about 41% of
the MI-eligible cases.
11. Limit the Scope of the "PriorRecord" Aggravator
The scope of the "prior record" aggravator could be narrowed by limiting
its applicability to those defendants with prior Ml convictions. As currently
drafted, this aggravator applies not only to a person who has been convicted of
Ml; it also applies to anyone "who has one or more serious assaultive criminal
convictions." 37 The Missouri Supreme Court has construed this factor broadly to
136.
See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing overlap between
the "avoiding arrest" and "killing witness" aggravators).
137.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(1) (2008).
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assault.
apply even to a defendant with a prior conviction for second-degree 39
Overall, this aggravator applied to at least 19% of the M I-eligible cases. 1

38

CONCLUSION

The analysis of intentional-homicide cases in Missouri demonstrates that
Missouri law fails to narrow the class of death-eligible homicides as required
under Zant v. Stephens. The Missouri statute eliminates fewer than 10% of Mleligible homicides overall which corresponds to fewer than 25% of all intentional
homicides. Prosecutorial discretion, then, defines which defendants face the death
penalty and which defendants do not, which defendants face LWOP, and which
face, at a maximum, life with the possibility of parole. Prosecutors apply their
discretion in vastly different ways, leading to large geographic disparities in the
rates of Ml and death penalty prosecutions and convictions. In combination with
racial housing patterns, these disparities also create or exacerbate large racial
disparities in prosecution of capital offenses.
By creating a structure that facilitates these disparities in outcomes, the
legislature has implicitly condoned the geographic lottery that this system at least
appears to create. While this Article does not analyze whether the disparities
amount to intentional discrimination-that is, whether the disparities are caused by
geography or race, instead of a by-product of other decisions-the appearance of a
geographic lottery and racial discrimination remains troubling. The policy changes
outlined in Part V provide a starting point for narrowing prosecutorial discretion in
Missouri in order to reduce the geographic disparities documented in this study
and comply with the Constitution's requirement that capital-punishment statutes be
narrowly drafted to include only the worst homicides committed.
APPENDIX I: LAW AND PRACTICE IN MISSOURI
This Appendix summarizes Missouri law governing the implementation
of capital punishment and provides comparisons to other key death penalty states

to give the reader an impression of the ways in which Missouri is both typical and
atypical. The discussion focuses on the ways in which Missouri law both narrows
and broadens the scope of prosecutorial discretion in comparison to other states.
A. Classification ofHomicide as Murder
There are now thirty-six death penalty jurisdictions in the United States,
including thirty-five states and the federal government. 40 Twenty-three of those
138.
139.

See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 339 (Mo. 1997).
The data do not contain complete prior record information, and so this is a

lower bound of the percentage of cases that are covered by this aggravator.
140.
The thirty-six jurisdictions that allow the death penalty are: Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wyoming, and the federal government. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., FACTS
ABouT THE DEATH PENALTY (2009), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). After the time period of this study, New York's
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thirty-six jurisdictions separate murder into two degrees. 141 In contrast, thirteen of
those jurisdictions have only one degree of murder.

42

Missouri, like most states,

divides murder into first-degree and second-degree murder.
Among the death penalty states with two degrees of murder, there is a
split between those that require serious reflection before an intentional murder will
be raised to first-degree murder, 43 and those which hold that "premeditation,"
and/or "deliberation" may take place immediately before or simultaneous with the
formation of the intent to kill, i.e., in a "twinkling of an eye."'' 44 Missouri is a
"twinkling of an eye" state. "Deliberation" is the key criterion in the Missouri
statute that separates first-degree murder from "knowing" second-degree
murder.145 "Deliberation" is defined as "cool reflection for any length of time no
matter how brief."' 46 As the following analysis demonstrates, under Missouri case
law the "deliberation" requirement is satisfied in almost every case involving
"knowing" second-degree murder. Thus, the only real difference between firstdegree murder and "knowing" second-degree murder is the severity of the
punishment.
highest court held the death penalty unconstitutional, People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88
(2004), and New Jersey and New Mexico repealed the death penalty. H.B. 285, 49th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009) (effective July 1, 2009); S.B. 171, 212th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(N.J. 2007) (effective Dec. 17, 2007).
141.
Jurisdictions that divide murder into two degrees are: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and the federal system.
142.
Jurisdictions with one degree of murder are: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, South Carolina,
Texas, and Utah.
143.

See ARIZ. REV.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 13-1105(A)(1) (2008), State v. Thompson, 65

P.3d 420, 424 (Ariz. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2008), People v. Anderson, 447
P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(a) (2004), Key v. People, 715
P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(1) (2008), Dupree v. State, 615
So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001-18-4003 (2008),
State v. Sheahan, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (Idaho 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(a) (2007),
State v. White, 950 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Kan. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a)
(West 2007), Bryant v. State, 900 A.2d 227, 238-39 (Md. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28303A (2008), State v. Batiste, 437 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Neb. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(2008); State v. Myers, 305 S.E.2d 506, 509 (N.C. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01
(West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(d) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.32.030(1)(a), 32.020(1)(a) (2008); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (a) (2008), Bouwkamp
v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493-94 (Wyo. 1992).
144.
For other "twinkling of an eye" states, see, for example, NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.030(1) (2007), Schoels v. State, 966 P.2d 735, 738 (Nev. 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STATS.

§ 2502(a) (West 2008), Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 1963);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-5 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2008), Weeks v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (Va. 1994).
145.
Missouri classifies a homicide as first-degree murder if a defendant
"knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.020.1 (2008). A defendant who knowingly causes the death of another
person without "deliberation" is guilty of second-degree murder. Id.§ 565.021.1(1).
146.
Id. § 565.002(3).
ANN.
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Under Missouri law, "a person commits the crime of murder in the first
degree if he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon
the matter., 147 There are only two permissible punishments for first-degree murder
in Missouri: the death penalty, or life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation or parole. 48 The crime of second-degree murder includes both felony
murder and homicides where the perpetrator acted "with the purpose of causing
serious physical injury to another person.' '149 Additionally, any homicide where the
defendant "knowingly causes the death of another person" qualifies as seconddegree murder. 150 The punishment for second-degree murder is much lighter than
it is for first-degree murder. Second-degree murder is punishable as a Class A
felony151 by ten to 52
thirty years imprisonment, or by life imprisonment with
eligibility for parole. 1
The statutory definition of murder in Missouri narrows the class of deatheligible offenses in two significant respects. First, most states classify some forms
of reckless homicide as murder, thereby making at least some reckless homicides
death-eligible. In contrast, Missouri classifies all reckless homicides as
manslaughter, not murder. 53 Because manslaughter is not a death-eligible crime,
the legislative decision to classify all reckless homicides as manslaughter narrows
the class of death-eligible offenses, and thereby narrows the scope of prosecutorial
discretion.
Second, most states that divide murder into degrees classify felony
murder as first-degree murder, 54 thereby making at least some felony murders
death-eligible (even if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim). 155 Missouri,
147.

Id. § 565.020.1.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. § 565.020.2.
Id. § 565.021.1(1).
Id.
Id. § 565.021.2.
Id. § 558.011.1(1).

153.

See id. § 565.024.1(1). In addition to Missouri, there are nine other death

penalty states that classify reckless homicide as manslaughter, not murder. See ALA. CODE §
13A-6-2(a)(2) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54a (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1
(2008); IND. CODE 35-42-1-5 (2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.050 (West 2008); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-31(A)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1) (2007); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.115(1)(a) (2008).
154.
See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(2) (2008); CAL. PENAL CODE §
189 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1)(a)(2)
(2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003(d) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(1)(b) (2008);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 2-201(a)(4) (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303A(2)
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(l)(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (2008); OKLA.
STAT, tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4(2) (2008); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.32.030(l)(c) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (a) (2008). In addition to Missouri, at
least three other death penalty states categorize felony murder as second-degree murder. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 635(2) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A)(2) (2008); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b) (West 2008).
155.
Historically, any death ensuing from the commission of one of the "big five"
crimes (robbery, burglary, rape, arson, and kidnapping) was automatically first-degree
capital murder, without more. The majority of capital jurisdictions still recognize deaths
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56
however, classifies felony murder as second-degree, not first-degree murder.'
Consequently, felony murder is not death-eligible in Missouri unless the
prosecutor can prove that the defendant killed the victim "knowingly ...after
deliberation upon the matter."'1 57 The legislative decision to classify felony murder
as second-degree murder also narrows the class of death-eligible offenses, and
narrows the scope of prosecutorial discretion.

Under Missouri case law, evidence of "deliberation" is usually deduced
from the circumstantial evidence of a culprit's actions."5 8 It is sufficient
"deliberation" if the intent to kill is formulated before the lethal blow is struck. 5 9

There need not be any "brooding" over the act for an appreciable time before the
defendant commences the fatal attack. 160 Missouri courts have consistently held
that "deliberation" may be found in cases involving firearms if the intent to kill
develops as the trigger is being pulled. In stabbings and other cases, deliberation
may be based on the fact that the defendant had to approach the victim before
attacking,' 6 1 The fact that the defendant armed himself with a deadly weapon
before a confrontation has often been sufficient evidence of "deliberation. ,162
Other instantaneous means of preparation for the deadly assault may be deemed
sufficient. 163 First-degree murder convictions are typically upheld in cases
involving "a prolonged struggle, multiple wounds, or repeated blows."'164 This

during the commission of the "big five" crimes as potentially capital murder, whether they
have one or two degrees of murder. However, for defendants convicted of murder on a
felony-murder theory, the Eighth Amendment restricts application of the death penalty to
(a) individuals who killed or intended to kill, or (b) individuals who were a major
participant in the crime and manifested extreme recklessness. See Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 151-52 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982).
156.
Missouri provides for second-degree murder "when another person is killed
as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration" of any felony or the flight
therefrom. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021(1)(2) (2008).
157.
Id. § 565.020.1.
158.
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that repeatedly listening to a rap song
that glorified killing could be introduced as circumstantial evidence of "deliberation." State
v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 761 (Mo. 2002).
159.
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that "in order to convict [a defendant
of first-degree murder], there must be some evidence that defendant made a decision to kill
the victims prior to the murder" as long as the defendant "coolly deliberated on the deaths
for some amount of time, however short." State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 376-77 (Mo.
1994).
160.
State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. 1991) (citing State v. Ingram, 607
S.W.2d 438, 443 (Mo. 1980)).
161.
State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Mo. 1988) (taking "a few steps"
toward the victim is sufficient).
162.
State v. Stacy, 913 S.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
163.
State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 532-33 (Mo. 1987) (slipping out of
handcuffs to attack police officers).
164.
State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 159 (Mo. 1998) (defendant bashed in the
head of the victim several times and then threw him into a fire); State v. Clark, 913 S.W.2d
399, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (firing of three shots used as additional evidence of
deliberation); Stacy, 913 S.W.2d at 386 (fourteen stab wounds).

HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 363 2009

364

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:305

165
holds true even where the initial attack may have been the result of provocation.
Chasing or followin the victim for some distance has sufficed to uphold a verdict
of "deliberation."'16 The Missouri courts have routinely upheld findings of
"deliberation" if the method of killing intrinsically requires more time to
consummate, such as by poisoning, strangulation, suffocation, drowning, or severe
beating or stomping.167 The fact that a defendant could have1 6halted
an attack, yet
8
persisted, has also been held to be evidence of "deliberation."

Evidence of the defendant's conduct after an attack has been used to
uphold the trier of fact's finding of "deliberation." Examples of this are the failure
of the defendant to attempt to save the life of his wounded victim, 1 69 or the hiding
or disposal of the body of the victim. 170 Even flight and disposing of the weapon
has been deemed to be evidence of "deliberation."'' 7271 Tying up the victim to
prevent seeking aid is also evidence of "deliberation."'
The lack of any meaningful distinction between "knowingly causing
death" and "deliberation" has been challenged on due process grounds in the
higher courts of the state, but to no avail. 173 The result is that all intentional
homicides based on feelings of revenge or carried out in connection with some
other unlawful purpose can be qualified as having been committed "with
deliberation upon the matter." The jury may return a verdict of first-degree murder,
thereby opening up the possibility of a death sentence, as long as there is
insufficient evidence of "violent passion suddenly aroused by some
provocation ' 174 to justify a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, under

165.
In State v.Santillan, the defendant twice shot the victim, who was dating the
defendant's girlfriend. 948 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo. 1997). While such evidence was
sufficient for a jury to find "deliberation," it was error not to give a second-degree murder
instruction. Id.
166.
In State v. Hatfield, a conviction of first-degree murder following a court
trial was affirmed where two men had a disagreement in a tavern and agreed to take their
differences outside. 465 S.W.2d 468, 470-71 (Mo. 1971). As they were leaving one broke a
beer bottle against the doorsill and pursued the other up the alley, inflicting fatal wounds
with the broken bottle, Id.Only seconds elapsed between the time the defendant armed
himself and the infliction of the fatal wound, and the defendant was obviously in an agitated
state. Id.
167.
See, e.g., State v. Parkus, 753 S.W.2d 881, 884-85 (Mo. 1988) (choking);
State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 72 (Mo. 1988) (stomping to death).
168.
Ervin, 979 S.W.2d at 159. In State v. Davis, 107 S.W.3d 410, 414-15 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003), the defendant stole a woman's car but, her child was left attached to a
seatbelt and dragging along the road as defendant made his get-away; defendant kept
driving, though he was repeatedly told that the child was being dragged.
169.
See, e.g., State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Mo. 1991).
170.
Though, admittedly, such evidence can also be consistent with a cover-up or
a second-degree murder. Santillan, 948 S.W.2d at 575-76.
171.
State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Mo. 2002).
172.
See State v. Stacy, 913 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
173.
See State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 716 (Mo. 2004); State v. Middleton,
998 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo. 1999); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851-52 (Mo. 1998).
174.
State v. Anderson, 384 S.W.2d 591, 608 (Mo. 1964); State v. Dickson, 691
S.W.2d 334, 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 364 2009

20091

PLACE MATTERS (MOST)

365

Missouri law, prosecutors, judges, and juries have virtually unlimited discretion to
choose between first- and second-degree murder in all cases where an intent to kill
is present.
In contrast to Missouri, several states that divide murder into degrees
require a more precise distinction between the mental states required for noncapital
second-degree murder and a potentially capital finding of first-degree murder. One
of the foremost states in this respect is California, which has interpreted its murder
statute to require something more than mere pre-existing intent to kill to constitute
"premeditation and deliberation." The seminal case involved a brutal killing of the
ten-year-old daughter of the defendant's girlfriend, committed when the defendant
had been drinking, in which the defendant stabbed her sixty times. 175 Missouri
courts would have upheld a first-degree "deliberate" murder conviction without
problem in such a case. The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, held that
the mere fact of the brutality of a killing and the infliction of multiple injuries
would not itself be sufficient to prove "premeditation and deliberation., 176 It noted
that "the legislative classification of murder into two degrees would be
meaningless if 'deliberation' and 'premeditation' were construed as requiring no
more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to
kill., 17 7 The California Supreme Court then listed three categories of evidence
which could support a finding of first-degree murder: (1) planning activity-facts
regarding the defendant's behavior prior to the killing which might indicate a
design to take life; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship or behavior
with the victim which might indicate a motive to kill; and (3) evidence regarding
the nature or manner of the killing 7which
indicates a deliberate intention to kill
8
according to a preconceived design.'
The District of Columbia courts also require more than a mere intent to
kill for a murder to rise to the first degree. The Court of Appeals has stated:
To speak of premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous,
or which take no appreciable time, is a contradiction in terms. It
deprives the statutory requirement of all meaning and destroys the
statutory distinction between first and second degree murder. At
common law there were no degrees of murder. If the accused had no
overwhelming provocation to kill, he was equally guilty whether he
carried out his murderous intent at once or after mature reflection.
Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and premeditated
murder from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an
intent to kill and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous,
more culpable or less capable of reformation than one who kills on
sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the death penalty is more
likely to deter men from deliberate than from impulsive murder. The

175.
176,
177.
178.

People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 947.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 949.
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deliberate killer is guilty of first degree murder; the impulsive killer
is not."'
In accord with the California approach, the District of Columbia has held
that even sordid, over-determined violent killings do not rise to murder in the first
"compulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy
degree if they were committed
80
of frenzied activity."'
The California approach laid out in Anderson has also been adopted in
Wyoming 8 ' and West Virginia.' 8 2 The Arizona Supreme Court also recently
cleared up the muddled difference between first- and second-degree murder by
distancing itself from an interpretation of "premeditation" that allowed a firstdegree murder charge upon a mere pre-existing intent to kill and that did not
require any actual proof of reflection. It held that "[lI]aws must provide explicit
standards for those charged with enforcing them and may not impermissibly
delegate basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis.' 83
In sum, if an intent to kill develops rashly as a result of motives
insufficient to reduce a crime to voluntary manslaughter, Missouri calls such
homicides "deliberate." Thus, numerous homicides' that would be classified as
noncapital second-degree murder in California and other states are classified as
first-degree murder in Missouri, and are potentially death-eligible.
B. Statutory Aggravating Factors
A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Missouri is not eligible
for capital punishment unless the prosecution proves one or more statutory
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.' 84 The Missouri Penal Code lists
seventeen statutory aggravating factors. This Article uses the following
185
abbreviations to refer to the seventeen statutory aggravators: prior record,
multiple homicide,' 86 hazardous device, 187 for money, 188 public official,' 89 agent or

179.

Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1941).

180.

Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C. 1982).

181.
Neither the excessive brutality of a killing nor the striking of repeated blows
with a weapon is sufficient to establish premeditation. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486,
493-95 (Wyo. 1992).
182.
State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 180-81 (W. Va. 1995). The court held that
the old "twinkling of an eye" instructions were "confusing, if not meaningless." Id
183.

State v. Thompson, 65 P.3d 420, 424, 429 (Ariz. 2003).

184.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2008).
Id. § 565.032.2(1) ("The offense was committed by a person with a prior
185.
record of conviction for murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed by a
person who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions.").
186.
Id. § 565.032.2(2) ("The murder in the first degree was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful
homicide[.").
187.
Id. § 565.032.2(3) ("The offender by his act of murder in the first degree
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person[.]").
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employee,' 90 wantonly vile,19 1 peace officer, 192 escaped custody, 93 avoiding
arrest,' 94 felony murder, 195 killing witness, 196 corrections officer, 197 hijacking, 198
concealing drug crime,' 199 other drug crime, 20020
and gang activity.20 '
The number and breadth of statutory aggravators in Missouri tends to
expand the class of death-eligible offenses, thereby broadening the scope of
prosecutorial discretion. With seventeen statutory aggravating factors, Missouri
ranks eighth among the thirty-five death penalty states in terms of the number of

188.
Id. § 565.032.2(4) ("The offender committed the offense of murder in the
first degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of
monetary value from the victim of the murder or another[.]").
189.
Id. § 565.032.2(5) ("The murder in the first degree was committed against a
judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney,
circuit attorney or former circuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or former assistant
prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney or former assistant circuit attorney, peace
officer or former peace officer, elected official or former elected official during or because
of the exercise of his official duty[.]").
190.
Id. § 565.032.2(6) ("The offender caused or directed another to commit
murder in the first degree or committed murder in the first degree as an agent or employee
of another person[.]").
191.
Id. § 565.032.2(7) ("The murder in the first degree was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind[.]").
192.
Id. § 565.032.2(8) ("The murder in the first degree was committed against
any peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty[.]").
193.
Id. § 565.032.2(9) ("The murder in the first degree was committed by a
person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement[.]").
194.
Id. § 565.032.2(10) ("The murder in the first degree was committed for the
purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of
lawful confinement, of himself or another[.]").
195.
Id. § 565.032.2(11) ("The murder in the first degree was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to
perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary,
robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195, RSMo[.]").
196.
Id. § 565.032.2(12) ("The murdered individual was a witness or potential
witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending prosecution, and was killed
as a result of his status as a witness or potential witness[.]").
197.
Id. § 565.032.2(13) ("The murdered individual was an employee of an
institution or facility of the department of corrections of this state or local correction agency
and was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or the murdered individual
was an inmate of such institution or facility[.]").
198.
Id. § 565.032.2(14) ("The murdered individual was killed as a result of the
hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance[.").
199.
Id. § 565.032.2(15) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of
concealing or attempting to conceal any felony offense..defined in chapter 195, RSMo[.]").
200.
Id. § 565.032.2(16) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of causing
or attempting to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a
felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo[.]").
201.
Id. § 565.032.2(17) ("The murder was committed during the commission of a
crime which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activity as defined in section
578.421 [.]").
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statutory aggravators.2 °2 In general, states with a greater number of statutory
aggravators give prosecutors more discretion to decide which cases should be
charged as capital cases. The sheer number of aggravators is only part of the story,
though, because states vary widely in the breadth of individual aggravators. It is
not necessary for the purposes of this study to compare the breadth of statutory
aggravators in different states.
C. Voluntary Manslaughter
In Missouri, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is defined as causing the
death of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder, except
that the death was caused "under the influence of sudden passion arising from
adequate cause." 20 3 "Sudden passion" is defined as "passion directly caused by and
arising out of provocation by the victim or another acting with the victim, which
passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former
provocation." ' 20 4 The offense must have been committed
in sudden passion, and not
205
after there has been time for the passion to COO1.
"Adequate cause" is "cause that would reasonably produce a degree of
passion in a person of ordinary temperament sufficient to substantially impair an
ordinary person's capacity for self-control. 2 6 To be "adequate," the provocation
must be of a nature calculated to inflame the passions of the ordinary, reasonably
temperate person. There must be a sudden, unexpected encounter or provocation
tending to excite the passion beyond control. "Passion may be rage, anger, or
terror, but it must be so extreme that... the action is being directed by passion, not
reason." 20 7 Words alone, no matter how opprobrious or insulting, are not sufficient
to show adequate provocation.2 8
Over the past few decades, many states, influenced by the Model Penal
Code, have broadened the category of homicides that qualify as voluntary

202.
203.

See supra note 41.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.023 (2008); State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 208

(Mo. 1996).
204.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.002(7).
205.
State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Mo. 1991). In states that follow the
Model Penal Code, there is no "cooling time" restriction. Hence, even in cases where there
has been a substantial lapse of time between the provocation and the killing, a defendant
may still be eligible for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.3(1)(b) (2008). See also MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE
375-76 (2002); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (N.Y. 1980).
206.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.002(1).
207.
Fears, 803 S.W.2d at 609 (quoting State v. Simmons, 751 S.W.2d 85, 91
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
208.
State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Mo. 1996); State v. Starr, 38 Mo.
270, 277 (1866). Beginning with Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862), some states began
departing from the common-law tenet that "mere words" could never amount to adequate
provocation. See also Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975); People v.
Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 11-15 (Ca. 1946). Cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 708-09
(3d ed. 2000).
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manslaughter. 20 9 In Missouri, though, the traditional common-law rules still apply.
Consequently, some homicides that would be classified as voluntary manslaughter
in states influenced by the Model Penal Code are classified as murder in Missouri.
Insofar as Missouri law narrows the class of defendants who are eligible to have
their offense reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter, the law expands the
class of death-eligible defendants, thereby broadening the scope of prosecutorial
discretion in choosing which cases merit capital punishment.
D. Inadmissibility ofIntoxication Evidence
In Missouri, evidentiary rules related to intoxication also have the effect
of broadening the class of death-eligible offenses. The majority of jurisdictions in
the United States allow evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the
"premeditation and deliberation" required to constitute first-degree murder, and
even the intent to kill necessary for a finding of murder in the second-degree. 2'0 In
contrast, Missouri law makes evidence of voluntary intoxication inadmissible in
the jury's determination of the defendant's mental state. 2 11 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that a similar Montana statute does not violate due
process, 2 12 the law does reduce the types of evidence a Missouri jury may consider
in determining whether to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Thus,
homicides committed by intoxicated defendants, which might yield a verdict of
second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter in other states, might well yield a
conviction for first-degree murder in Missouri, thereby making the crime
potentially death-eligible.213 Thus, the legislative decision to exclude evidence of
voluntary intoxication effectively broadens the scope of prosecutorial discretion in
choosing which crimes merit capital punishment.

209.
The Model Penal Code classifies as manslaughter a "homicide which would
otherwise be murder" when "committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.3(1)(b) (2008). At least fourteen states have adopted this definition, which does not
require provocation, may be triggered by "mere words," and is not necessarily invalidated
by "cooling time." SANFORD H. KADISH
PROCESSES 418-19 (7th ed. 2001).

& STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

210.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(1) (2008); People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370,
374 (Cal. 1969); Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Ind. 1984); Roberts v. People,
19 Mich. 401 (1870); Commonwealth v. Graves, 334 A.2d 661, 662-64 (Pa. 1975). See
generallyLAFAVE, supra note 208, at 412-16.

211.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076.3 (2008) (providing that "[e]vidence that a person
was in a voluntarily intoxicated or drugged condition may be admissible when otherwise
relevant on issues of conduct but in no event shall it be admissible for the purpose of
negating a mental state which is an element of the offense").
212.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
213.
There are approximately ten other states that, like Missouri, preclude
defendants from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication. See SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMNAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 870 (7th ed. 2001). See
LAFAVE, supra note 208, at 414.

HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 2009

370

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:305

E. Proportionality Review
For each death sentence that reaches the Missouri Supreme Court on
direct review, the court is required to determine whether "the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant." 214 For the purpose
of facilitating this review, the statute provides for an "assistant to the Supreme
Court" who shall accumulate "the records of all cases in which the sentence of
death or life imprisonment without probation or parole was imposed" and "provide
the court with whatever extracted information
the court desires with respect
21 5
thereto," in order to assess proportionality.
2 6
Missouri's proportionality statute mirrors that of the State of Georgia. 1
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia,217 Missouri

was one of twenty-six states that adopted a requirement of proportionality review
modeled on the Georgia statute.218 After the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
proportionality review was not required by the Eighth Amendment,219 nine states
repealed their proportionality review statutes, and several others abandoned the
practice. 220 At present, seventeen of the thirty-five states that allow
221 capital
punishment maintain a statutory requirement for proportionality review.
In conducting proportionality review, the Missouri Supreme Court
considers all cases in which a capital charge was submitted to the jury, but does

214.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.035.3(3) (2008).
215.
Id. § 565.035.6.
216.
Under the Georgia scheme, the Supreme Court is required in every case to
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-35(c)(3) (2008). If the court affirms the death sentence, it is to include in its
decision reference to similar cases that it has taken into consideration. Id.§ 17-10-35(e).
The court is required to maintain records of all capital felony cases in which the death
penalty was imposed since 1970. Id. § 17-10-3.
217.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
218.
Timothy V. Kaufian-Osborn, Capital Punishment,ProportionalityReview,
and Claims of Fairness(with Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 790
(2004).
219.
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984).
220.
Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 218, at 791-96. For a list of the states that no
longer conduct proportionality review, see State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 n.1 1 (Tenn.
1997).
221.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(g)(2)(a) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.075(3)(c) (West 2007); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9.1(1)(c) (2008); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035.3(3) (West 2008); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(1)(c) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (2008); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XI)(c) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (2008); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(c)(3) (2008); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-12(3) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2008);
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(c)(2) (2008); and WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2008).
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not consider other death-eligible cases. 222 The issue for the court is not whether the
death sentence is appropriate for the particular individual, but whether any
defendant in similar circumstances should be eligible for the death sentence.22 3
Only when the case, "taken as a whole, is plainly lacking [in] circumstances
consistent with those in similar cases where a death penalty has been imposed"
will resentencing be ordered by the Supreme Court.224 If there are no prior similar
cases on record, the Supreme Court will make an independent judgment as to
whether the imposition of the death sentence is wanton or freakish under the facts
of the case.2 25 Accomplices' "plea agreements and convictions for crimes other
than first-degree murder are not ...

death sentence.

considered in the proportionality review of a

226

In theory, the statutory requirement for proportionality review is designed
to narrow the class of death-eligible offenses and narrow the scope of prosecutorial
discretion. In practice, though, proportionality review does not actually have that
effect because the Missouri Supreme Court's review is largely perfunctory. In fact,
the Missouri Supreme Court has reversed only one death sentence as
"disproportionate., 227 In a second case, the Court set aside the "death sentence
based on a combination of comparative weakness of evidence and favorable
evidence of the defendant's background. 228 Missouri's record of proportionality
review is fairly typical. Of the state high court "decisions in capital cases rendered
between 1975 and April 1996, only fifty-five death sentences were vacated
on the
229
ground of disproportionality, while 1376 death sentences were affirmed.,

222.

State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo. 1984); State v. Mercer, 618

S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1981) (cited in 32 ROBERT H. DIERKER, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES,
MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 57.10 (2d ed. 2007)). Missouri's approach to proportionality
review is followed by seven other states, which also review cases that go to a penalty
hearing along with those that result in a capital judgment. Eight states take the narrower
approach and only consider death judgments. Finally, three states consider all death-eligible
cases.
223.
State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 383 (Mo. 1988).
224.
State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 926 (en banc) (Mo. 1996) (quoting State v.
Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)); see also DIERKER, supra note 222,

§ 57.10.
225.
State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Mo. 1993); see also DIERKER, supra
note 222, § 57.10.
226.
State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 549 (Mo. 2003) (quoting State v. Clay,
975 S.W.2d 121, 146 (Mo. 1998)); DIERKER, supra note 222, § 57.10.
227.
State v. Mcllvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 342 (Mo. 1982). In that case, the Court
appears to have been strongly influenced by the defendant's conduct in voluntarily
surrendering to authorities. DIERKER, supra note 222, § 57.10.
228.
DIERKER, supra note 222, § 57.10; State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo.
1998). The Court concentrated for the first time on the "strength of the evidence" and went
beyond its mere sufficiency. Id.
229.
Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 218, at 792 (citing Donald H. Wallace &
Jonathan R. Sorenson, Comparative ProportionalityReview: A Nationwide Examination of
Reversed Death Sentences, 22 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 35 (1997)).
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II: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Creation of the Comprehensive Database
Data in the comprehensive database is derived almost exclusively from
records contained in county courthouses. There are 115 counties in Missouri, each
with its own courthouse, its own records, and its own record-keeping system. Most
of the collection of court documents for creation of the comprehensive database
was completed in 2003. At that time, many county courthouses were not
computerized and most of the counties that did maintain electronic records did not
have an ability to search their databases electronically to identify all of the
homicide cases in a given time period.
We relied primarily on a list provided by the Office of State Courts
Administrator (OSCA) to identify cases for inclusion in the comprehensive
database.230 In fall 2002, OSCA provided us a list of all the cases in Missouri with
an initial charging date between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001 where
the defendant was charged with either murder or voluntary manslaughter and the
defendant was convicted of a homicide offense. OSCA refused to provide
information about cases that were dismissed, or that resulted in nonguilty verdicts,
because that information is confidential. 3 We verified and augmented the OSCA
list by asking county clerks to double-check the information provided by OSCA.
Most of the clerks said that they had no way of knowing whether the OSCA
information was complete. A few clerks identified some cases that met our
parameters that had been inadvertently omitted from the OSCA list. Thus, it is
likely that the comprehensive database excludes a small number of intentionalhomicide cases within the time frame of this study that were inadvertently omitted
from the OSCA list, and that county clerks were unable to identify. Even so, we
are confident that the comprehensive database contains the vast majority of cases
that satisfy our criteria for inclusion in the database.23

230.
In 1994, the Missouri legislature appropriated funds to develop a statewide
court automation system. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 476.055 (2008). Missouri Supreme Court
Rules provide that the "office of state courts administrator will operate the court automation
central computer sites." Mo. SUP. CT.OPERATING R. 1.03. The Rules also require all state
courts to "report case information to the Office of State Courts Administrator." Mo. SUP.
CT. OPERATING R. 4.28. Thus, insofar as state courts comply with their reporting
obligations, and insofar as OSCA manages the court automation system effectively, OSCA
should have records of all the criminal cases prosecuted in Missouri since about the mid1990s.
231.
OSCA also refused to provide the names of defendants; all cases were
identified only by case numbers. Every case that involved a change of venue was doublecounted. If venue changed twice, the case was triple-counted. Thus, in the early stages, we
devoted substantial effort to eliminating double- and triple-counting problems.
232.
There are several factors that support this conclusion. First, OSCA has a
statutory mandate to collect information about all the criminal cases prosecuted in Missouri.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text. County clerks report relevant information to
OSCA on a regular basis. OSCA has established procedures for recording the information
obtained from county clerks in its database. Undoubtedly, there are data entry and other
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After obtaining the list of cases from OSCA, we sent law students to
county courthouses to review courthouse records. The goal was to obtain a limited
set of information about every case in the comprehensive database.233 To obtain
the relevant information, we created a data-collection form. We also prepared
detailed instructions for students about how to complete the data-collection form.
Ultimately, students visited eighty-three of the 115 county courthouses in
Missouri. There were nine counties that did not have any murder or voluntarymanslaughter cases in the time frame under study. There were also twenty-three
counties that had one or two M2 or VM cases, but no M1 cases. County clerks sent
us documentation for the cases234from those counties, but students did not visit the
courthouses to review records.
1. Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion
We included cases on the basis of initial charging date (rather than, for
example, disposition dates or crime dates). Specifically, we included cases where
the first indictment or information was filed between January 1, 1997 and

errors that affect the accuracy of OSCA's data. However, OSCA's procedures provide
safeguards to minimize such errors.
One county that has an exceptionally good computerized case-management system is
Pulaski County. In the early phases of data collection, we were able to check the accuracy
and completeness of the OSCA data for Pulaski County by comparing the OSCA data to
Pulaski's own data. (The clerk in Pulaski County had records of about twenty-five cases,
most of which were transferred to Pulaski on change-of-venue motions. The cases that
originated in other counties do not count as "Pulaski cases" in our final tabulation.) This
process revealed that cases charged as "capital murder," rather than "first-degree murder,"
were inadvertently omitted from the data initially provided by OSCA. OSCA then corrected
that omission by providing an additional list of cases charged as "capital murder." In the
end, we identified only ten cases that were omitted from the final OSCA list, suggesting that
the list was substantially complete.
233.
For every case in the comprehensive database, we collected copies of the
following documents: a docket sheet (if available); the initial indictment or information; any
amended indictment or information; the sentence and judgment form; the plea agreement (if
the case resulted in a guilty plea); the verdict form (if the case went to trial); and the notice
of aggravating circumstances (for cases where the prosecutor sought death). For cases
initially charged as M2 or VM, students merely reviewed enough of the file to confirm that
there was no M1 charge, collect the relevant documents, and complete the data-collection
form. For cases initially charged as Ml, students reviewed the entire file to determine
whether there was any evidence that the prosecutor sought the death penalty at any time
during the process. In addition to the documents noted above, they collected additional
documentation that provided evidence that the prosecutor did, or did not, seek the death
penalty (e.g., pretrial motions opposing capital punishment, jury instructions, etc.) The
information recorded on the data-collection forms was entered into an electronic databasethat is, the comprehensive database.
234.
The primary reason for sending students to visit county courthouses was so
that students could review the entire file for every case initially charged as Ml to obtain
documentation necessary to determine whether a case should be classified as a "capital
charge." For cases initially charged as M2 or VM, there was no need to review the entire
file because those cases are all "noncapital cases." Therefore, if a county did not report any
Ml cases, there was no need for students to visit the courthouse.
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December 31, 2001.235 Cases charged before Dec. 31, 2001 are included even if
there was no final disposition until several years later. 236 Cases initially charged as
murder or voluntary manslaughter are included, even if the defendant was
ultimately convicted of a lesser offense, such as involuntary manslaughter. Cases
in which charges were dismissed, and those that resulted in not-guilty verdicts, are
excluded from the database, both because the individuals were not demonstrably
guilty, and because the records are not publicly available.237
2. CountingIssues
For the purpose of counting cases, the unit of analysis is a "defendantcrime," except as provided below. Because we focus on the initial charging
decisions of prosecutors, a single initial charging decision by a specific prosecutor
against a single defendant for a specific crime generally counts as one case.
Consistent with this counting rubric, if a prosecution was initiated in County X and
there was a change of venue to County Y, we count that as one case (one initial
charge), not two cases. 238 If two or more co-defendants were charged with the
same crime, we count the case against each co-defendant as a separate case. If one
defendant committed a series of homicides in separate incidents, each incident is
counted separately. If one defendant was charged with multiple homicides in a
single incident, we count that as one case. There are a few cases in which the
defendant was charged with murder in an indictment filed after January 1, 1997,
the defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal, and the prosecutor filed a writ
of habeas corpus adprosequendum before December 31, 2001. These cases are

235.
There are fifteen cases included in the comprehensive database where the
initial indictment or information was filed before January 1, 1997, the defendant's
conviction was reversed on appeal, and prosecutors filed a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum to initiate a new prosecution between January 1, 1997 and December 31,
2001. The rationale for including these cases is that we are studying prosecutorial charging
decisions in a given time frame. Because the decision to file a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum is essentially a new charging decision, we count the filing of such a writ as
the initiation of a new case if it is filed within our time frame.
236.
In September 2006, we deleted four cases from the comprehensive database
that had still not reached a final disposition. In one such case, the attorneys were still
debating whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. In another case, the defendant
absconded and was never found. At the same time, we also deleted two cases where the
clerk was never able to locate the file.
237.
Because we are investigating the charging decisions of prosecutors,
excluding the subset of defendants who are found not guilty could potentially introduce
some bias in our estimates. Having been found not guilty suggests that the prosecutor's
charging decision was more aggressive in these cases.

238.

Under Missouri law, in every criminal case triable by a jury, the defendant is

entitled to an automatic change of venue if the initial charges are filed in a county with a
population of 75,000 or fewer. MO. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32.03(a). Thus, most of the cases
initiated in small counties were transferred to other counties before trial. Overall, 161 out of
1046 cases in the comprehensive database changed venue at least once.
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counted as two cases because they involve two independent charging decisions by
a prosecutor.239
3. Division into Capital Charges andNoncapital Cases
In general, when a prosecutor in Missouri decides to seek the death
penalty, he or she files a "notice of aggravating circumstances." For our purposes,
every case in which the prosecutor filed a notice of aggravating circumstances
counts as a capital charge, even if the prosecutor later agreed to a plea bargain that
provided for a lesser sentence. Moreover, a case counts as a capital charge if the
defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and accepted a sentence of life without
240
parole, even if there was no notice of aggravating circumstances in the file.
Additionally, there are a few cases in the database for which there was no notice of
aggravating circumstances in the file, but there was other documentation indicating
that the prosecutor sought the death penalty. Examples of such other
documentation include entries on 'docket sheets, jury instructions, and defense
motions to preclude the application of capital punishment. A case counts as a
capital charge if such other documentation shows clearly that the prosecutor
sought capital punishment at some time during the process.241
B. Creationof the DetailedDatabase
After compiling the comprehensive database, we selected a "detailed
database" of cases to study in greater detail. The initial detailed database included
129 capital charges, 242 plus 130 noncapital cases that were selected at random from
the comprehensive database, for a total initial sample size of 259 cases. Because
the goal was to perform detailed analysis of cases in the detailed database, we
ultimately eliminated eighteen defendants from the detailed database about whom
we were unable to obtain sufficient information, including eight capital charges
and ten noncapital cases. We also added six more capital charges that we
239.
The comprehensive database includes eight cases that are "double-counted"
in this way. There is no optimal way to deal with these cases. They are not two truly
independent cases. However, if these cases were treated as one case, it would present a
problem whether to count the initial decision or a subsequent decision. For example, if the
death penalty was originally sought, but not sought in the second trial, did the defendant
face a death trial? Our decision to treat the cases as two separate cases is also consistent
with our treatment of other cases involving separate trials outside our time period.
240.
We assume that a defendant would not plead guilty to first-degree murder
and accept a sentence of life without parole unless the prosecution had at least threatened to
seek the death penalty. However, in three cases where the defendant pled guilty to firstdegree murder and accepted a sentence of life without parole, there is affirmative evidence
that the prosecution did not seek the death penalty. Those cases are not counted as capital
charges.
241.
The final detailed database includes 127 capital charges. Our files contain a
notice of aggravating circumstances for 108 of those cases.
242.
The final comprehensive database includes 133 capital charges. However,
data collection for the comprehensive database was incomplete at the time the detailed
database was created. At that time, we had identified only 129 cases as capital charges. All
129 cases that were identified as capital charges at that time were initially included in the
detailed database.
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discovered after the initial creation of the detailed database. Hence, the final
detailed database consists of 247 cases, including 127 capital charges and 120
noncapital cases.
We sought information about these 247 cases from six different sources:
(1) the court records that had been collected for creation of the comprehensive
database; (2) a web-based database called "Case.net," which provides access to the
Missouri State Courts Automated Case Management System; 243 (3) published
appellate opinions; (4) newspaper articles; (5) criminal-history information
obtained from the FBI; and (6) police reports obtained from the state and local
law-enforcement agencies that investigated the homicides.
For the vast majority of cases in the detailed database, the police reports
provide the most detailed factual information about the case. There were two
reasons why we decided to rely primarily on police reports, rather than trial
transcripts, to obtain detailed factual information about the cases. First, and most
importantly, relying solely on those cases that went to trial would introduce
significant bias in the sample, since fewer than half of the cases in the detailed
database actually went to trial. 2 " Second, we were operating on a limited budget,
and it was less expensive to collect police reports for all the detailed database cases
than it would have been to obtain trial transcripts for the subset of cases that went
to trial.
Collection of police reports was generally a two-step process. First, we
contacted county prosecutors to find out which law-enforcement agency
maintained the investigative file for each case. (Some files are held by county
sheriffs, some by city police departments, and some by the Missouri State
Highway Patrol.) Second, we contacted the law-enforcement agencies directly to
obtain copies of the investigative reports.245 Cooperation from prosecutors and
law-enforcement officials was uneven. Some were eager to provide the requested
information. Others were reluctant to do so, despite the fact that police
investigative reports are classified as public records under the Missouri Sunshine
Act after a case becomes "inactive. 246
Case.net data is available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/
243.
base/welcome.do. Case.net does not provide information about the underlying facts of
homicide cases, but it does provide basic information about the judicial process, such as
charging and sentencing information. To access information on Case.net, one must have a
case number or the defendant's name (or both).
244.
The final detailed database of 247 cases includes 137 cases resolved by
guilty pleas, 17 cases decided by bench trials, and 93 cases decided by jury trials.
245.
The level of detail contained in police investigative reports varies widely.
Some reports consist of hundreds of pages of documentation. Others include only about a
dozen pages. There is no standard format for these reports, and there do not appear to be any
guidelines specifying the type of information to be included.
246.
The Sunshine Act distinguishes among "arrest reports," "incident reports,"
and "investigative reports." Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.100.1 (2008). All incident reports and
arrest reports are public records. Id.§ 610.100.2. However, to obtain detailed factual
information about a case, it is necessary to procure the investigative report. Investigative
reports are initially closed; they become open records once an investigation is no longer
active. Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 413-14 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). An
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We were unable to collect police reports for some cases that remained
"active" as of fall 2006, when we halted data-collection efforts. We were also
unable to collect police reports for some inactive cases because the relevant public
officials refused to provide the requested information.247 Ultimately, we eliminated
eighteen cases from the detailed database due to inadequate information, resulting
in a final sample of 247 cases. We successfully obtained police reports for most of
those 247 cases. The final detailed database includes forty-eight defendants for
whom we never obtained police reports; we retained those cases because we were
able to obtain sufficient information from appellate opinions and other sources to
merit inclusion in the detailed database.
We created two different data-entry forms for the detailed database cases.
The main data-entry form is a thirteen-page form. We provided a detailed set of
written instructions to assist students in completing the form. For each case in the
detailed database, a law student reviewed the police reports, court documents and
appellate opinions, and completed the data-entry form on that basis. If the review
of those documents left key questions unanswered, students used Case.net to
provide supplemental information about the judicial process, and newspaper
articles to provide supplemental information about the underlying facts. After
students completed the data-entry forms, a law professor reviewed the forms and
raised questions about issues that were unclear. Students modified the forms on
that basis. Then, after the revisions were complete, other research assistants
entered the data from those forms into an electronic database. This data was linked
with the criminal-history records of defendants, provided by the FBI.
We created a separate data-entry form for the detailed database cases to
provide specific information about aggravating circumstances. The Missouri death
penalty statute has seventeen aggravating circumstances.248 The "aggravator form"
lists the seventeen statutory aggravators. Law students reviewed the case files and
completed one aggravator form for each case in the detailed database. For every
case, students provided one of three possible answers for each aggravator: (1) the
prosecutor actually charged this aggravator; (2) the prosecutor could have charged
this aggravator, but did not; or (3) there is insufficient evidence to support this
aggravator. 249 Before students completed any of the aggravator forms, one student
reviewed Missouri Supreme Court decisions interpreting the aggravating factors
and provided a summary of relevant case law that served as guidance for the
students who completed the aggravator forms. Students completed aggravator
investigation is active until "the convictions of all persons convicted on the basis of the
information contained in the investigative report" are final, either "by exhaustion of or
expiration of all rights of appeal of such persons." § 610.100.1(3)(c).
247.
In other states, where researchers have been given a legislative mandate to
conduct similar studies, it appears that public officials have been very forthcoming in
providing researchers all available data. Obviously, the refusal of some Missouri officials to
provide requested information affects the reliability of conclusions that can be drawn on the
basis of the data collected.
248.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032 (2008).
249.
A prosecutor "could have charged" an aggravator if he or she could make a
good-faith, reasonable argument in support of a decision to charge that aggravator in a
particular case.
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forms for the capital charges before they completed forms for the noncapital cases.
Once they completed review of the capital charges, we used that information to
summarize the actual charging practices of prosecutors in cases where prosecutors
charged aggravators. The summary of charging practices provided additional
guidance to students in evaluating which aggravators prosecutors "could have
charged" in the noncapital cases.
Students provided a narrative summary of each case at the end of the
aggravator form. A law professor reviewed every aggravator form for
completeness and accuracy by comparing the entries for individual aggravators to
the summary at the end of the form. For two of the seventeen statutory
aggravators, the process involved one additional step. The "prior record"
aggravator relates to the defendant's prior criminal record. A law professor
modified the student responses for that aggravator based upon a review of the
criminal-history information that we obtained from the FBI. The "wantonly vile"
aggravator is the broadest and vaguest statutory aggravating factor; it applies to
any murder that "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, or depravity of mind. ' 250 For every case in which prosecutors did
not charge that aggravator, a law professor reviewed the narrative summary and
made an independent determination as to whether the prosecutor could have
charged the "wantonly vile" aggravator in that case. Once this analysis was
completed, all of the data from the aggravator forms was electronically recorded.
C. Analytical Methodology
To provide measures of geographic disparities, we analyzed the complete
universe of cases in the comprehensive database because, for every case in the
comprehensive database, the database contains information about the county of
origin and the decisions made in each stage of the decision process. To provide
measures of racial disparities, we derive estimates from the detailed database
because information about race of victims and race of defendants is available only
for cases in the detailed database. Those estimates are based on a weighted average
that accounts for the sampling method we employed. The detailed database
includes all capital charges (probability of inclusion = 100%) and 130 randomly
selected noncapital cases (14.2% of 915 cases).2 We weight by the inverse of the
probability of inclusion in the detailed database (so called "probability weights"),
where cases are weighted to represent the equivalent number of cases in the
universe of cases. Thus, capital charges are weighted one (each capital charge in
the detailed database represents one capital charge in the universe of cases) and
noncapital cases are weighted 7.09 (each noncapital case in the detailed database
represents about 7.09 noncapital cases in the universe of cases). We also control
250.
§ 565.032.2(7). The Missouri Supreme Court has adopted an expansive
interpretation of this aggravator, making it potentially applicable to almost every murder.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
251.
As noted above, the final detailed database includes only 120 noncapital
cases because we eliminated several cases due to inadequate information. However, at the
time we initially selected the detailed database, we randomly selected 130 noncapital cases
from a universe of 915 noncapital cases. We used those figures to determine the proper
weighting for a weighted average.
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for the finite size of the universe of cases in determining standard errors and test
statistics. We use the same weighted averaging method in Parts IV and V.
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